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Abstract
This project examines the imposition of austerity measures on two periphery countries in the
Eurozone – Greece and Ireland – after the global financial crisis that erupted in 2007. Ireland was the first
economy to both enter and exit the crisis. Greece is still reeling from it, 9 years later. This project offers a
detailed analysis of the policy response and economic conditions in each country, and reveals that
Ireland’s success is illusory. Even though Ireland exited the crisis in 2013, their ‘success’ was in part due
to the relatively small size of fiscal contraction, the rebuilding of private sector savings, and the return to
a net-exporting position. By contrast, Greece’s adjustment to austerity was much more severe, the private
sector financial position never fully recovered, and the country remained in a net-importing position.
Although Ireland faced difficulties adjusting with some recommendations by the IMF, the Greek crisis
and rounds of austerity were far more severe and detrimental to their social welfare levels than Ireland.
This project focuses on the flawed monetary arrangement and institutional design of the Eurozone
focusing specifically on the differences between core and periphery countries under a stateless currency
regime that has divorced fiscal and monetary institutions. Using the sectoral balances and the Parenteau
model, we study public, private and foreign debt as well as the policy space available to give an insight
into the two economies.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Austerity

A singular event in the initial years of the 21st century changed the lives of many people across
the globe. It was the 2007 global financial crisis. This crisis, curiously enough, was wrought with what
was described as the ‘financial equivalent of the weapons of mass destruction which devastated lives and
lands during the World Wars’. The crisis emanated from the shores of the most influential economic
epicenter, the United States, and rapidly spread to engulf the whole world, a stark reminder of how
intertwined all economies are in this increasingly globalized world. The ostensible catalyst, the bursting
of the US housing bubble, caused a serial and rapid destabilization of the global banking sector, leading to
seizing up of credit activity, thus causing convulsions in the global financial value chain, and a sharp reset
of all asset prices across the world. As a natural corollary, the crisis spread to the European Union (EU),
significantly impacting the weaker and more vulnerable ‘periphery’ countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy,
Greece and Spain).
The events and the aftermath are still fresh in everyone’s mind and efforts to normalize the
situation still continue eight years on. This project examines two economies -- Greece and Ireland. The
story of these two economies and the journey to recover from what seems to be an almost hopeless
situation is a fascinating one. Clearly both the economies could be accused of hubris or profligacy, but it
is nevertheless important to analyze, why recovery and austerity measures seem to have benefitted the
Irish economy, while not producing a similar positive impact on the Greek economy. This serves as the
primary objective of this paper.
The Eurozone crisis has exposed existential flaws of the entire Eurozone regime. The buildup of
grave macroeconomic imbalances that remained completely unchecked, imploded on the heels of the US
crisis leading to the vulnerable banking and public finance problems across the periphery countries in
Europe. Since interest rates were already alarmingly low, these countries could not rely on expansionary
monetary policy. At the same time, the automatic fiscal stabilizers in response to the falling demand,
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produced extremely high budget deficits and public debts. Some countries are still suffering the effects of
cyclical economic downturns, thus making it the longest crisis period after World War II. The average
public debt in the European periphery itself has not been this high since wartime.
This crisis exposed the structural vulnerabilities of the European Monetary Union (EMU)
countries. The underlying causes of the European debt crisis are complicated and cannot be attributed
simply to years of assumed fiscal profligacy. Some key impacting factors were the lack of common fiscal
policy, large disparities in the economic development between the core and periphery countries, financial
imbalances in some countries, and failure to agree on a prudent fiscal policy direction. For the first time
since the creation of the common currency, there is an alarming looming threat to its existence. This
project investigates the reasons why the EMU does not function without further fiscal integration.
The Troika, a tripartite committee formed by the European Commission (EC), the European
Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) acted for the first time, with respect to
Greece in 2010, by implementing a minor package to limit the Greek deficit. This initiated a perfect storm
of pension reductions, wage cuts, higher taxes, layoffs, and privatizations. In the timespan between 20082013, over six million jobs were lost. The crisis caused detrimental effects to the periphery region of the
European Union. Fiscal consolidation has seemingly lead to devastating problems specifically in Greece
and Ireland.
This paper examines the austerity measures imposed on the Irish economy and evaluates if the
widely-accepted claim that it has yielded positive results. In addition, it studies the wide-ranging
explanations about the failure of the austerity measures in Greece and contrasts them with the Irish
‘success-story’. Furthermore, this project will assess, not only the size and type of austerity, but also the
financial reforms, growth channels, composition of private sector debt, trade profiles, and some purely
psychological aspects in assessing the economic challenges of these two periphery countries.
This project hypothesizes that the Irish ‘success’ is illusory and that the effects of austerity are much more
similar between the two economies. In evaluating the specific situation in the Greek and Irish economies,
we test our hypothesis using the modern monetary approach; analyzing the three sector balances and the

3
Parenteau model, pioneered by the the Levy Economics Institute at Bard College. Our research reveals
that austerity cannot be viewed as ‘successful’, but due to the birth defects of the Eurozone it is embedded
and therefore inevitable in the Euro Area, thereby producing a vicious macroeconomic cycles
The structure of this project is as follows:
•

Chapter 2 offers a literature review on the topic

•

Chapter 3 discusses the birth and birth defects of the Eurozone

•

Chapter 4 examines the Greek and Irish economies during the crisis period, identifying parallels
and contrasts in their respective experience

•

Chapter 5 employs the contributions of the Cambridge Keynesian and Modern Money School to
deepen our analysis

•

Chapter 6 presents the three sector balances and Parenteau diagram in order to illustrate the
macroeconomic challenges facing Greece and Ireland in the face of austerity. We also discuss the
briefly the situation in Germany

•

Chapter 7 presents a detailed chapter displaying the effect of austerity on both economies

•

Chapter 8 offers policy recommendations for the individual countries, as well as for the Euro area
as a whole

Chapter 9 concludes.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review: Delving Deeper into Austerity
It appears - because it has been the case for twenty years - that every problem is solvable...that no matter
how badly the world economy slumps there is a pain-free way out of it. Once the realization dawns that
there is not, and that the pain will be severe, the question is posed that has not really been posed for
twenty years: who should feel it?
-Paul Mason (2009)
In this section, we will be using facets of literature to provide an insight into the current crisis as
well as the answer to our research question. This includes an analysis of spending cuts, taxes, and
austerity measures to set the groundwork for the main research question. We use a variety of diverse
literature from a vast array of sources to establish a multifaceted literature review elaborating on the
Greek and Irish circumstances, delving deeper into economist’s opinion of what could be the root of the
economic crisis. We look at the basic idea of austerity, its effects on specifically Greece and Ireland as
well as its functionality in the past as well as the difference between an austerity package that is primarily
based on taxes versus one that relies on spending cuts. Moreover, we analyze the Maastricht criteria and
the European treaties to grasp the reason why the core countries are economically superior to the
periphery countries.
The crisis revealed the fragility of global financial systems. Wyplosz (2010) states that the crisis
can not be considered exogenous and did not completely spill over from the American economy. As we
delve deeper into research, it is evident that there were problems within the European Union since its
birth.
The adoption of the common currency led to the convergence of the interest rates in most
periphery countries to the level of interest rates of the core countries, thus in combination with rising
capital inflows owing to greater financial integration, there was an increase in growth as well as
government revenue and spending. However, the real appreciation led to a loss of competitiveness in
periphery countries, adversely affecting export performance and leading to imbalances in the current
account. Moreover, core countries such as Germany managed to maintain their competitive edge through
wage restraint allowing them to increase their exports to periphery countries as well as lending to non-
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core countries. The mechanism and foundation fundamentally led to imbalances in the European Union. It
is a highly unsustainable regime which became clear after the global financial crisis and the current
sovereign debt crisis as analyzed and concluded by Lin and Trichel (2012). We will further elaborate on
the fundamental problems of the European Union in Chapter 3.
Table 2.1.1: Warning Indicators Prior to 20072
Indicators

Greece

Ireland

Italy

Portugal

Spain

Indicators of macroeconomic
imbalances:
Budget deficit

√

Government debt

√

Current Account deficit

√

√

Loss of competitiveness

√

√

√

Bank Assets- Growth

√

√

√

Bank Loans- Growth

√

√

√

Private credit to GDP

√

√

Private credit to deposits

√

√
√
√

√

√

Indicators of financial
imbalances:

Real Estate bubble

√

√

√

√
*

√

Anzoulatos (2012) digs into warning indicators prior to the crisis shown in Table 2.1.1. The
indicators display the macroeconomic data reflecting the problematic predicament the periphery countries
were already in, prior to 2007. This raises the question of whether the cause of the sovereign debt crisis
was completely due to the global financial crisis, or whether the financial crisis was just another domino
in the equation? It may seem that the countries in crisis are largely responsible for their fate. However, as
we delve deeper, it appears that regardless of substantial current account deficits and fiscal profligacy-the responsibility does not exclusively lie with the periphery countries.

2

Source: Anzoulatos (2012)
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Moreover, the banking and financial system’s opaqueness as to the level of risk and inadequate
risk- management systems evident by the lack of quantitative models are more reasons which fomented
trouble for the periphery countries. Furthermore, the ineffective supervision leads to unchecked
proliferation of excesses which, for so long, curiously escaped the attention of supervisors for decades.
The poor performance of essential elements of the economic system such as credit rating agencies
contributed further to misleading economic indicators. The agencies may have indirectly misled investors
to finance countries with severe high debt and economic imbalances. The staggering differences between
the core and periphery countries which would eventually lead to a need for different economic
perspectives.
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2.1 The Economics of Austerity
The main economic concept we investigate in this paper is austerity. Austerity is defined as a set
of policies with the aim of reducing government budget deficits3. These are comprised of measures such
as spending cuts, tax increases, or a mixture of both imposed on a country to show the fiscal discipline of
the government by bridging the gap between revenues and expenditures. We explore different opinions
about the success vs. failures of the implementation of austerity measures.

2.1.1 Arguments for and against Austerity
Arguments for Austerity
The key arguments that all economists on this side of the argument seem to use are:
a)

No pain no gain

The periphery countries cannot always be dependent on their prudent northern neighbors for a bailout. It’s
a hard lesson, but it is a lesson that is needed. (Blyth 2013)
b)

What does not kill you makes you stronger

Austerity may be painful but will teach the Eurozone nations the necessity of shock treatment to ensure
they can hold their own in a very globalized economy. From Mexico in the 1980s to Baltic States now,
there have been examples of how austerity can spark sustainable recovery. (Debating Europe, 2012).
There have been previous examples of European Union countries that succeeded in implementing
austerity measures which lead to growth in the economy for example Germany 2004-2007.
c)

The ‘free rider’ problem

In a currency union, state's have to play by the rules. The various treaties and pacts are to promote
stability between the diverse groups of nations with strict implementation to prevent any economy from
slacking off. This raises the question, why should the hard-working taxpayers of Germany or the
Netherlands have to fork out for a southern spending spree? (The Economist, 2015).

3

Definition from Merriam Webster
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d)

Austerity = Recovery

There can be no real recovery until the southern nations get their public finances in order. It is impossible
to spend your way out of a recession and it’s important to prevent any untenable strains on the rest of the
European currency union.
e) Spending cuts and structural reform are actually beneficial in the long term
There are a few advantages of fiscal consolidation and austerity, it can drive down interest rates and
improve trade balance by decreasing imports and increasing exports (only if the interest rates go down
and the exchange rate depreciates). It can also increase competitiveness by a reduction of wages (for
example in Germany). It is also possible to reduce crowding out by lowering the government expenditure
into the private sector. However, this only works when a company is working at full capacity. If an
economy is in a recession running below capacity, then there exists conditions of surplus labor and funds
for investment.
According to Haltom and Lubik (2013), even if austerity is detrimental in the short run, it can
provide long-term benefits. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) discovered empirical evidence that suggested
that past financial contractions were expansionary focusing on two isolated cases in Denmark and Ireland
in the 1980s. Perotti (1995), Ardagna (1998 and 2009) found that some episodes of austerity and fiscal
consolidation lead to an increase in economic growth through spending-based consolidations leading to
economic growth while consolidation based on tax increases were associated more with recessions.
Moreover, the IMF published a paper (Guajadro, 2011) stating that even though fiscal consolidation tends
to be contractionary in the short run, in the long run, however, they agree that tax increases tend to be
more harmful to economic growth than spending cuts. Austerity measures clearly have not worked in the
case of Greece yet; this sparks a debate on how to measure fiscal contractions. Perotti (2012) argues that
studies of fiscal consolidation can not possibly be measured on a yearly basis and that they span over
multiple years. The yearly data may not capture the fiscal consolidations accurately. Using case studies of
four specific consolidation episodes in Denmark, Ireland, Finland and Sweden, Perotti (2013) argues that
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there are other factors such as-as exchange rate adjustments that promoted stabilization eventually leading
to economy growth.

Arguments Against Austerity
This section focuses on the more popular literature that is against the use of austerity measures. Most
economists agree that austerity is and has proven to be detrimental to most economies.
The main points that all economists on this side of the argument seem to use are:
a)

Tax increases are harmful to the economy and debt

Gale (2014) states that high tax rates slows down the economy immediately and depress future growth,
they do not often promote revenue growth as investment decreases and consumption decreases. It is also a
tool politicians do not prefer as it leads to a lot of chaos between the people. For example, in Greece, an
increase in taxation of electricity, lead to an angry mob of protests by the population who could not afford
to even turn on the lights. Economic harm can easily be done by the increasing of taxes, however,
government expenditure on unemployment insurance and poverty programs such as the job guarantee act
may be a silver lining.
b)

Spending cuts can improve an economies condition and the budget yet to date “austerity in

Europe” has consisted mainly of tax increases
In Sub-chapter 2.1.4, we explore the relative effects of spending cuts vs. tax increases. Economists on this
side of the argument such as Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) claim that spending cuts and structural reform is
a better alternative to taxing yet, taxation is the more popular tool of austerity4. Giavazzi and Pagano
(1990) claim that government spending cuts will possibly increase consumer confidence, because
consumers will spend more money in anticipation of future lower taxes, however, this aim was rejected
stating that spending cuts depress the economy rather than improve it Perotti (1997). Figure 2.1.3 shows

4

Note: We can see from Appendices 3A, 3B, 7A, 7B there was a mixture of both spending cuts and taxation. In fact,
there was a higher implementation of spending cuts in Greece.
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the Greek contributions to GDP and it’s clear that household expenditure does not increase under any
form of austerity. (Schwaderlapp, 2015)
c)

Structural reforms can permanently improve economic performance

Structural reform of social transfer and poverty programs can substantially increase long-run growth. A
program that helps those who are unemployed keep in touch with the skills necessary to be competitive.
There is a vast array of reforms including the health care system, labor laws and programs, deregulation
of administered private prices etc. (Flesher, 2014).
d)

Austerity is causing social problems in most countries where tougher austerity policies are

being implemented
Austerity is destroying the social fabric of most peripheral European nations. It’s hardest on the poor who
played no role in causing the crisis, while bankers and politicians do not face the same extent of the crisis.
Austerity has caused income inequality to decrease in Greece, the poor are still poor, and the rich are even
poorer.
e)

All current economists and economic policies are aimed at reducing the public deficit-to-GDP

ratio, arguments are using multipliers instead of facing the obvious- the structure of the European
Monetary Union
This raises the question; why should the debt-to-GDP ratio be 60%? Is there a specific level of debtto-GDP level a country should attain not to have any economic problems?
Many debates between economists are not based on the understanding of the absence of a sovereign
currency, its consequences or sectoral balances but by the use of multipliers.
The main issue with the fiscal multipliers is the constant systematic overestimation of forecasts. The
actual results of austerity have worsened the economic conditions of most European countries. The World
Economic Outlook (WEO) found in October 2012 that the forecasts of economic growth have been
systematically over stated by a large margin. The WEO confirms that this also applies to the forecasts of
the members of Troika as well as the private forecaster, the Economist Intelligence Unit. The multiplier
used in forecasts by the IMF were around 0.5.
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The WEO now estimates the real multipliers to have been around 0.9 and 1.7. The gap between the
forecast and reality is about 0.4 to 1.2. This shows that the negative effects have been at least three times
as great as the forecast suggests. The WEO’s estimate is consistent with economist Krugman’s estimates
which he calculated to be 1.25. He further notes that “1 euro of austerity yields around 0.4 euros of
reduced deficit, even in the short run”. Wolf (2015) states that the multiplier is actually 1.5: “Every
percentage point of structural fiscal tightening is estimate to lower GDP by 1.5%...the 8% points of
structural fiscal tightening in Greece lowered its GDP by 12%” (WEO, 2012).

2.1.2 The Rules of the Game: Austerity by Design
The Maastricht criteria signed on the 7th February 1992 was an amending treaty signed by 12
countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom).
The Criteria established are as follows: 5
1.

An inflation rate of no more than 1.5 percentage points above the average of the three countries with
the lowest inflation rates

2. No exchange rate realignment for at least two years
3. Nominal long-term interest rates not exceeding by more than 2 percentage points of those for the
three countries with the lowest inflation rates
4. A government budget deficit not in excess of 3 percent of each country’s GDP
5. A gross debt to GDP ratio that does not exceed 60 percent
There has been extensive debate about the purposes and main aims of the Maastricht criteria. Arguing
on behalf of many diverse countries, there were difference of opinions and arguments between officials
and academic experts. The primary aim is to only allow the countries which meet these criteria into the
Eurozone. The first convergence criteria were carefully premeditated to ensure maximum monetary

5

Criteria collected from Panos Afxentiou, Convergence, the Maastricht Criteria, and Their Benefits, 2000.
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stability by supporting the fixed exchange rate regime which is further protected by maintain inflation and
controlling government budget deficits for all 12 countries.
Table 2.1.2 Countries Percentage of time fulfilling Maastricht Debt, Deficit and Inflation criterion6

Country

Months of

Months of

Months

% fulfilled of

% fulfilled of

% fulfilled of

fulfilling

fulfilling

fulfilling

inflation

debt criteria

deficit

inflation

debt criteria

deficit

criteria

criteria
Germany

criteria

criteria
132

132

96

100

100

38.46

Ireland

72

108

12

54.54

90

92.31

Greece

71

0

156

53.78

0

0

Spain

75

36

36

56.81

50

76.92

France

132

48

84

100

36

46.15

Italy

112

0

96

84.8

0

38.46

96

42

150

72.72

38.9

3.85

Portugal

Table 2.1.2, above, shows the percentage of months select European Union countries have spent
fulfilling the Maastricht inflation, debt and deficit criterion between 1995 to 2007. Evidently, the sole
economy to fulfill all the debt and inflation criteria in that time range is Germany.7 The “core” countries
including Germany and France have on average complied 70.1% (over 92 months on average) of the
fulfillment of afore mentioned criteria whereas the periphery countries have an average of 47.5%. Clearly,
Greece as well as Spain have a low average of maintaining their debt-to-GDP and inflation criteria. With
the exception of Portugal, most other countries achieved high growth of GDP in the first years of the
Eurozone8. It is important to explore and comprehend the criteria to examine the dilemma Greece and
Ireland. Figure 2.1.1 and 2.1.29 show the radial diagrams diagrammatically illustrating the Maastricht
criteria shortly after their respective years of convergence following the formation of the European Union.

6

Calculated by author using data from Eurostat
However, Germany faced minimal levels of government deficits.
8
See Appendix 1A for Real GDP Growth Graph
9
Tables 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 show the numerical values shown in the radar diagrams
7
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It’s clear that both economies’ indicators are dissimilar when compared to the criteria of the Maastricht
Treaty, especially for Greece. For Ireland (Figure 2.1.1) we use the year 1999 and for Greece (Figure
2.1.2) we use the year 2001, which is when Greece joined the EMU. Furthermore, in chapter 4, we
present the same diagram for post-crisis and current criteria.
Figure 2.1.1: Radial Graph of Maastricht criteria and Ireland’s indicators in 199910
Infaltion Rate
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Debt to Gdp /10

Long Term Interest Rate

Government Budget Deficit
Maastricht Criteria (1999)

Ireland (1999)

Table 2.1.3: Maastricht Criteria and Ireland’s indicators in 1999

10

Criteria

Maastricht Criteria (1999)

Ireland (1999)

Inflation Rate

1.09

1.63

Long Term Interest Rate

4.65515

4.769166

Government Budget Deficit

-3

2.417720828

Debt to Gdp /10

6

4.7

A government budget deficit not in excess of 3 percent of each country’s GDP
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When Ireland officially entered the European Union, it’s clearly visible in Figure 2.1.1 above,
that the indicators were far off from the Maastricht criteria for that specific year. The Maastricht criteria,
displayed in brown is on the outside of the green line which reflects the Irish data in 1999. Figure 2.1.2
below shows the Greek version after entering the European Union in 2001. However, unlike Ireland,
Greece’s radial line, shown in blue, does not completely fall inside or on top of the Maastricht criteria,
shown in brown. They had a higher deficit level as well as a higher debt to GDP ratio than that allowed by
the Maastricht Criteria11, however, they had just gained entry into the Eurozone.
Figure 2.1.2: Radial Graph of Maastricht criteria and Greece’s indicators in 2001
Maastricht Criteria (2001)

Greece (2001)

Infaltion Rate

Debt to Gdp /10

Long Term Interest Rate

Government Budget Deficit

Table 2.1.4 Maastricht Criteria and Greece’s indiactors in 2001
Criteria

Maastricht Criteria

Greece (2001)

(2001)

11

Inflation Rate

2.66

3.05

Long Term Interest Rate

5.0273

4.75

Government Budget Deficit

-3

-5.466055745

Debt to Gdp /10

6

10.68

See page 11.
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2.1.3 The Effects of Austerity on Greece and Ireland

“Greece has a role model, and that model is Ireland” — Jean-Claude Trichet (2010)
To explore the effects of austerity on Greece and Ireland, it’s important first to explore the Greek
and Irish timelines as well as the IMF packages implemented.
Greece
January 1st, 2001, Greece drops the drachma and enters the European Union. To meet the EU’s
standards, Greece makes deep cuts in public spending. However, Greece joined the EU on erroneous.
They portrayed their economy to be much healthier than the reality. On November 15th, 2005, Greece
admits it gave misleading information to gain admittance12. In 2009, Greece’s debt reached 129.7% of
GDP leading to government spending cuts which incited unrest with angry mobs and strikes across the
nation. The crisis forced the IMF to intervene. The first austerity package on the 9th of February lead to
public worker strikes and soon led to the EU finance ministers announcing a €30 billion bailout package
for Greece. Shortly after the Greek debt to GDP level spiked up to 148.3% in 2010, another round of
austerity measures was imposed-- detrimental to the average Greek people. The next round of austerity
was in 2011 of a €130 billion deal with the IMF. As the debt kept exploding and finally reached 175.1%
in 2013, more and more austerity measures and bailout packages were issued leading to a snowball effect.
For a further detailed timeline for Greece see Appendix 3A and for detailed IMF packages report see
Appendix 7A.

12

Note: After years (2002-2004) of refusals b Eurostat to validate data transmitted by the Greek government, on
March 2014, Eurostat started an audit that noticed irregularities (the word falsification was never officially used) in
the data submitted by the Greek government leading to criticism of the Greek nation around Europe.
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The impact of the rescue package based on austerity measures lead to:
a)

Electoral repercussions

Firstly, the crisis has completely altered the terms of the Greek political system from left-wing
and right-wing political parties and from ‘pro-austerity’ and ‘anti-austerity’. Most politicians neglected to
listen to the value of good economics and instead switched to the ‘benefits’ of self serving politics.
b)

More unemployment

In 2010, disposable income decreased by 12.4% compared to 2009. The top 20% earn as much as seven
times as much as the bottom 20% (OECD, 2010). The OECD average of employment between the ages of
15 to 64 is 65% whereas Greece clocks in at 49%. Unemployment has continued to rise steadily
throughout 2013, especially due to the increase in pink slips handed out as a coping mechanism to rising
taxes and spending cuts. This had a cascading effect with increasing levels of youth unemployment as
well as rising inequality.
c)

Social unrest

Perhaps the most distressing effect of austerity measures is how it affected the average Greek citizen.
There have been riots, strikes, negative propaganda against Germany as bankruptcy threatened the
country. For a country that gets a large proportion of its income from tourism, the increase in social unrest
impacted tourism. It became difficult for the average Greek citizen to look at the opportunity cost or
analyzing the long-term benefits of spending cuts versus tax increases, they became upset with the
debilitating impact of a massive increase in taxation and job losses leading to massive poverty. A fraction
of the country is becoming homeless while the rest are finding a way of scrounging up change to maintain
a shelter over their roof and basic dignity in life.
d)

Rise in poverty, suicide, depression and homelessness

In 2011, alone, 372,000 people were at risk of social exclusion and poverty. According to the latest
figures from the Bank of Greece, 45% of pensioners received monthly payments below the poverty line of
just 665 euros. The population at risk of poverty is around 36%. Another cause for a fall in tourism
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between 2011 and 2012 of -5.5% (UNWTO). Pension slashes are leading to even more people falling into
poverty.
e)

Deterioration in health and education

Healthcare is one the numerous public services that have been hit hardest by the crisis. An estimate of
800,000 Greek people is without medical access due to a lack of insurance or due to poverty. There have
been clinics and social incentives to help people and efforts to ease the burden, however, they have been
forced to close down due to budget cuts. HIV infections among drug users rose from 15 (in 6000) in 2009
to over 500 (in 6,000) in 2015. Regarding education, only 68% of adults are now even considering
completing secondary education; there has been a decline in recent years.

Ireland
Ireland was the first Eurozone country to fall into recession in September 2008. During the
international financial crisis, Ireland announced a bailout plan worth €400 billion to stabilize the countries
leading banks. The Irish government used large quantities from the Troika bailout funds to aggressively
intervene in propping up the precarious banking sector. In 2009, spending cuts were imposed leading to
tens of thousands of protestors to rally nationwide. Shortly afterwards, the Irish government consistently
took growing stakes in the Anglo Irish Bank. In 2010, Ireland accepted a €67.5 billion bailout package of
which it injected €3.7 billion. Shortly after, the Irish voters approved a European treaty aiming to enforce
stricter fiscal discipline. On December 13, 2013, Ireland successfully exited the bailout program first,
however, the Irish economy had it easier than the Greek. For a further detailed timeline for Ireland see
Appendix 3B and for detailed IMF packages report see Appendix 7B.

The impact of the rescue package based on austerity measures lead to:
a) Unemployment and falling demand
The first and the most visible effect of austerity on Ireland is unemployment. In 2011, the unemployment
rate was 14.4%. Youth unemployment was dwindling between 30-32% leading to an increase in long-
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term unemployment, and Ireland now stands third after Greece and Spain. A rise in unemployment caused
an expected significant fall in aggregate demand.
b) The Celtic Tiger
The disreputable Irish “Celtic Tiger” was the era that ended with the collapse of a housing bubble and a
banking crisis. The Irish government had implemented a wide range of policies to foster improvements in
productivity and efficiency. There was a gradual improvement in the standard of education as policies
were formed to provide more importance on education. By the 2000s, the Irish productivity was
extremely close to US levels. Ireland has had previous experience with economic crisis and thus it may
have been more prepared for the most recent crisis (Whelan, 2013)
c) Export sector and investments hit hard
Ireland is a small and highly open economy that has a high fraction of export-platform foreign direct
investment operations. Thus, Ireland traditionally runs a large trade surplus. Ireland’s cost
competitiveness was eroded in the later years, and their net exports have been declining even though they
are net-exporters. During the collapse of the housing bubble, the roles played by investment and net
exports were 25% and 10% respectively in 2007, yet by 2013 they were around 10% and 25%
respectively.
d) Skill waste of a whole generation of young people
Skill loss is inevitable during unemployment. However, owing to the high level of youth unemployment
in Ireland. It has become a significant problem regarding the future since the young of today may possess
less employability than those in the core and even some other periphery countries.
e) Poor people, the vulnerable and dependents mostly paying for the price
30% of the Irish population is at risk of poverty or social exclusion, they are distanced from the labor
market and are currently facing the consequences of having lost the skills during their period of
unemployment.
To diagrammatically see the impacts of the rescue packages (during and after the crisis) on the GDP for
both economies we would like to study the relative contributions to GDP.
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Figure 2.1.3: Greece: Key Economic Variables and their contribution to GDP (Percentage) 13
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Figure 2.1.4: Ireland: Key Economic Variables and their contribution to GDP (Percentage)14
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Figure 2.1.3 shows Greece’s breakdown of contribution to GDP, and as expected consumption
has the largest contribution to GDP. However, it is interesting that even during and after the crisis, even
though Real GDP growth had a downward trend, consumption consistently increased. However, in
Ireland, Figure 2.1.4, consumption had a lower contribution to GDP and was consistently around 50%.
Interestingly, the Real GDP growth lines for both the countries are practically inverse of each other.
Greece has its lowest peak in the same year Ireland has its highest peak. In Ireland, the lack of
expenditure by the households and the alarmingly low investments over the past few years show the effect
of strict austerity measures specifically on Ireland, although the same could be said for Greece. The
household sector undoubtedly faces the brunt of the crisis. The export sector is often an advantage for
many countries but mostly to super exporting countries like Saudi Arabia, Germany, and China.
Another argument consistently used by those supporting austerity is that austerity measures is that
it inspires confidence among investors- improving the economy due to the belief that the government will
be able to live up to its’ commitments (Graham 1998). However, this logic is flawed, any investor would
fear a spiking and notorious debt load, especially if they fear the government may not be able to repay
them back. Figure 2.1.3 shows clearly that investment has not increased to the extent that people expected
it to. Figure 2.1.4 shows the consumption (which comprises on average of 60% of aggregate demand has
the highest percentage, investment, however, is barely visible in 2011 and 2012 showing the ‘negative
effects’ of austerity before Ireland exited the crisis in 2013. As visible, the Greek and Irish real GDP
growth levels seem to be moving in an opposite direction. Ireland is achieving higher growth levels than
Greece that shows deteriorating real GDP growth levels.
Moreover, when looking at the trends of the interest rates on 10-year government bonds in
Figure. 2.1.5 below, you can see the major increase in the interest rates which lead to the Greek,
Portuguese and Irish government bonds being potentially fatal to any investor. After Greece adopted the
Euro in 2001, all the government bond yields converged. Moreover, after the crisis hit the Eurozone, it’s
clear that Greece faced the debilitating impact of the crisis followed by Portugal and Ireland.
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Figure 2.1.5 Interest Rates on 10-Year Government Bonds (Percentage)15

15

Source: Liu (2013) Data: Eurostat
Note: Greece introduced the Euro in 2001 and converged perfectly with the rest until the Lehman bankruptcy.
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2.1.4 The Effects of Spending Cuts vs. Tax Increases
One area where questions remain is the relative impact of tax changes versus spending changes.
Traditional macro econometric forecasting models tend to find that spending changes, both expansions
and contractions, pack a stronger punch than tax changes, particularly when the tax changes are
expected to be temporary. But the needed head-to-head test of the two types of fiscal changes, where the
same care is used to identify exogenous changes, has not yet been done.
-Christina Romer (2012)

Over the past several years there has been extensive research about the relative effects of tax
changes versus changes in government spending. However, identifying the numerical effect of these
changes is tricky. This is because changes in taxes and government spending respond endogenously to the
business cycle, complicating efforts among researchers to identify the relative impact of tax versus
spending changes (Jalil, 2012).
A few primary pieces of literature that we read which advocated that expansionary fiscal
adjustments are not impossible was by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), Guajardo et al. (2011) and Romer
and Romer (2010) which implement the narrative approach to discuss the effects of changes in taxes and
changes in the government spending on real output. They aim to find a feasible way to shape fiscal
adjustments with as little cost as possible to any economy given debilitating monetary conditions. It’s fair
to assume that not all fiscal adjustments may lead to economic expansion, however, spending-based
adjustments are often less recessionary than tax increases. (Guajardo et al. 2011)
Romer and Romer (2010) focus on tax changes, however, do not focus on which change has
greater effects on output. Moreover, Guajadro et al. (2011) find that tax-based consolidations are
associated with greater output effects than spending-based consolidations. They claim that tax increases
are more amplified than spending increases since a tax increase is likely to raise prices and leading to an
increase in interest rates by the central bank as hey are inflation-averse. (Jalil 2012).
The main problem with this argument is that it does not offer a prescription of the type or the size of
austerity measures that can bring succor to a suffering economy. President Obama’s “balanced approach”,
supported by the IMF (Leigh 2013) proposed adopting a mix of spending cuts and tax increases, focusing
more on structural reform. It’s a known fact that different types of austerity measures produce different
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results (Alesina and Ardagna 2009) hence the one size fits all is a mistaken notion where austerity
measures are concerned. In fact, based on some of the periphery countries’ pre-Maastricht records, it is
easy to conclude that the sustainability in the long term would not be easy. This makes it clear that one set
of criteria and one currency does not work perfectly for each country (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008).
The general consensus is that fiscal adjustment packages that compromise mostly of reform and
spending cuts are more likely to lead to a more lasting debt-to-GDP reduction than those austerity
measures which are underpinned more by tax cuts. However, Jalil (2012) compared the output effects of
fiscal consolidations in countries where monetary authorities are constrained in their ability to counteract
shocks due to lack of an independent central bank. The extent to which government spending and tax cuts
increase aggregate demand depend on the tax and spending multipliers. The tax multiplier is smaller than
the spending multiplier since entire government spending directly goes into increasing aggregate demand.
If the main aim is to shrink income, there is a need for a much larger tax increase since the multiplier is
smaller, it is more recommendable to implement spending cuts as it has a higher multiplier. A much
greater tax increase is needed to reduce income than a spending cut.
Christina Romer and David Romer (2010) of the IMF developed a new approach that guarantees
the “exogeneity” of fiscal adjustments. They state that there is a different way to identify large exogenous
fiscal adjustments to reduce the debt aggressively and it is unrelated. Their research found that fiscal
adjustments based mostly on the spending side are less likely to be reversed and thus lead to long-lasting
reductions in debt-to-GDP ratios (which is the primary aim.) However, Alesina, Ardagna and Biggs
(2009) show that an estimated 80 percent of adjustments studied were failures. During a time of financial
crisis, lawmakers and those in power are more often than not driven by opportunistic politics and
capitalism than they are by good public policy and social welfare. Moreover, spending cuts are often the
first salvo that causes lawmakers to lose their next election. However, Goldman Sachs Economics
Outlook shows that spending cuts can be politically beneficial. Moreover, it also states that there is “no
evidence that governments which quickly reduce budget deficits are systematically voted out of office”
there may be a mildly negative chance of re-election.
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Alesina and Ardagna (2012) analyzed some OECD countries that show the ten largest episodes of
fiscal adjustments. Figure 2.1.5 below shows the improved economic condition by measuring the
percentage change in deficit / GDP Ratio in different periods and with different durations.
Table 2.1.5 Percentage Change in Deficit/GDP Ratio for the 10 Largest Episodes of Fiscal Adjustments
Country

Period

Years

Percentage Change in
Deficit/ GDP Ratio

UK

1994-2000

7

-11.1

Sweden

1993-1998

6

-14.1

Norway

1999-2000

1

-7.4

Netherlands

1993-1997

5

-8.6

Japan

1979-1987

9

-8.1

Ireland

1986-1989

4

-7.6

Germany

1984-1990

7

-10.7

Denmark

1983-1986

4

-15.1

Canada

1993-1997

5

-8.1

Belgium

1996-2000

5

-10.6

Kannan, Scott and Terrones (2012) state that the difference in outcomes is the result of the
business cycle and government intervention such as monetary policy rather than the composition of fiscal
adjustment packages. The standard explanation is that lower spending offsets the expectation of higher
taxes in the future thus having a positive effect on households and investors. Alesina, Ardagna and Perotti
(1998) have noted that fiscal adjustments are “multiyear rich policy packages”. Austerity measures are
often implemented while lawmakers are implementing other growth-enhancing policy changes. Several
polices have a moderately contractionary effect of fiscal adjustments and enhance their chances of
success. For example, a liberalization of markets for labor, goods and services tend to have a more
positive affect on economic growth. Germany’s fiscal adjustment of 2004 to 2007 provides a good
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example since the economy implemented a tax reduction incentive as a part of a series of supply-side
reforms between 1999 and 2005. The effects were visible towards the beginning of 2004. This, however,
lead to a fragility in the labor market and thus there was a need of tight structural reform to tackle this
market rigidity.
These reforms included “an increase in the statutory retirement age, the elimination of early
retirement clauses, and tighter rules for calculating imputed pension contributions” (Breuer 2011). The
above, along with large expenditure cuts in public administration fringe benefits and a reduction in
subsidies lead to the slight improvement in Germany. This raises the question, once again, that is it
possible to design a fiscal adjustment package that could both reduce the deficit and have a minimal
impact on the economy. The peripheral countries on average in Europe have a stronger private sector than
public sector, they also have a high income through tourism, thus cutting spending does not necessarily
hurt the poor due to the wastefulness and inefficiency of the public sector (Alesina 2012). There is always
a way to economize without hurting the bottom 20%, dependents who are most vulnerable. Alesina
(2012) states that austerity based solely spending cuts are costly, especially as it has a higher multiplier
than taxation. Greece was decimated with spending cuts which lead to a gradual deterioration of the
economy.
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Chapter 3
European Union Economics
3.1 Common Currency and its problem: Modern Money approach
My brother, if you mint coins, I want you to adopt the same divisions of value as in French money ... I’ve
already done the same thing for my own Kingdom of Italy. The confederated Princes have done the same
thing. That way there will be uniformity of currency throughout Europe, which will make trading much
easier.
-Napoleon Bonaparte (1807)
For centuries, the idea of a common currency seemed like a good idea for those involved; it
would lead to fewer transaction costs within the Eurozone for changing currencies, price transparency,
improvement in inflation performances, eliminating exchange rate uncertainty, beneficial to the financial
sector by lowering the transaction costs within the Eurozone, etc. The question on everyone’s mind was
whether a nation would increase its development when a country decides to abolish its national currency
and instead adopt a currency of a much wider region? The answer was an unequivocal yes. The
establishment of the Euro was the world’s first regional common currency. Mundell’s Theory of
Optimum Currency Area argued that maximum economic efficiency is achieved if the region is sharing a
single currency. Mundell (1961) listed advantages to this situation such as price comparability, crossborder investments, labor mobility, general trades, foreign direct investments and elimination of
transaction costs. However, he also highlighted some significant disadvantages to the Euro, such as a
limited loss of political and social autonomy. The European Union was originally established on the
essential objectives of peace, safety, economic and social solidarity and security and to be a model of
society. However, as time passed, the primary objectives seemed far from their existential worries.

One way to analyze the euro’s future is to examine its past and go back to the origins of modern
day money using Menger (1892) and Goodhart (1998). Menger’s theory speaks of buyers and sellers
agreeing on a common commodity as a medium of exchange: something small, valuable, non-perishable
and divisible so that traders do not face any further costs while bartering. Menger’s theory (1892) is a
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market-led response to transaction costs, which the private sector uses as money as a solution. Goodhart
(1998) provides economic analysis and assessment of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of
the Euro in the context of the Optimal Currency Area (Mundell, 1961). He believes that they key issue
with a single currency depends on the political relationship between the control over money and
sovereign power, especially in a situation like Europe that is historically massively interconnected.
Goodhart speaks of the Cartalists (which he refers to as the “C team”) argues that currencies become
money simply due to the active involvement of the government. His example includes setting up a mint to
produce coins and demand taxes are paid in the state money.

The key relationship in the C team model is the centrality of the link between
political sovereignty and fiscal authority on the one hand and money creation, the
mint and the central bank on the other. A key fact in the proposed Euro system is
that the link is to be weakened to a degree rarely, if ever, known before. … There
is to be an unprecedented divorce between the main monetary and fiscal
authorities … the C team analysts worry whether the divorce may not have some
unforeseen side effects. (Goodhart 1998:409)
The conclusion is that the euro needs a greater fiscal integration, not because some countries
spoiled a ‘perfect plan’ with profligacy, but because the euro allows the disconnect and divorce of fiscal
power and monetary power.
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3.2 The Institutional Design of the EMU
The process of monetary union goes hand in hand, must go hand in hand, with political integration and
ultimately political union. EMU [economic and monetary union] is, and always was meant to be, a
stepping stone on the way to a united Europe.
-Wim Duisenber (1999)
The Eurozone is a flawed monetary arrangement: We examine the stark differences between core
and periphery countries, subject to one monetary policy under a stateless currency regime that has
divorced the fiscal and monetary institutions. From the beginning, the idea of the EMU rested on a
gamble. Since 1992, when the European leaders decided to opt for the European Monetary Union they
concluded that with ease, the southern European countries would adopt the “golden” German economic
standards of lower inflation, wage growth, more saving and less spending. They also hoped Germany
would become more like them: accepting more government and private spending, higher wages, and price
inflation. However, this, of course, did not occur, and the actual implications of this gamble are becoming
clear. (Weiss, 2000) The alarming fact is that the short-term symptoms of the crisis are not as detrimental
as the long-term challenge which remains.

The European economies that converged have to pay attention to their domestic macroeconomic
behavior to ensure are similar enough to each other’s single monetary policies. For this to happen
countries such as Germany and the deficit countries in the periphery must align their trends in inflation,
public spending and private spending and competitiveness of their goods and services. The problem is the
fundamental disequilibrium within the Eurozone which applies a single monetary policy and a single
exchange rate to a diverse group of economies. Structural reform, austerity, taxation, micromanagement
of national budgets or bailouts are insufficient to distract speculators and solve the problem. Instead, the
burden must also be shifted from Europe’s public sector to the private sector and from its deficit countries
to its surplus countries- without this Europe will possibly face a long-term economic catastrophe. (Weiss,
2000)
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The main problems with the institutional design of the European Union as well as the Euro are:

•

Interest rates that are not suitable for the entire Eurozone

A common monetary policy entails a common interest rate for the entire area set by the ECB. This rate is
completely inappropriate for regions which are growing at either end if the band of economic growth in
the Eurozone. For example, in 2011, the ECB, while trying to control the fear of inflation in Germany,
increased the interest rates, which were unsuitable for the periphery countries still trying to cope with
Troika’s austerity packages.

•

The Euro is not an optimal currency area

For decades’ people have been comparing the European Union to the US economy. There are several
flaws with that statement. The American economy is an optimal currency area. If New Jersey were in a
state of recession, workers could quickly move to New York without having to change countries without
having to learn new languages, etc. There are more barriers to the movement of labor and capital within
Europe than there are in the United States. A Greek unemployed worker, lacking basic skills due to loss
of work after the crisis cannot easily relocate to for example Germany. The European Union is diverse
enough that they should have different monetary policies. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) suggest that
if the proposed EMU were composed of only Germany, the Benelux Countries, France and Denmark, it
would enable them to be an optimum currency area.

•

The limitations of fiscal policy given the common monetary policy

With the common monetary policy, it’s crucial to have similar levels of national debt to attract potential
buyers of national debt. This will be further elaborated on in the next sub-chapter.
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•

Lack of incentives

Towards the beginning of the formation of the Eurozone, some economists argued that being a member of
the Eurozone protects a country from a currency crisis. This offers less of an incentive for countries to use
austerity measures. When Greece was facing an economic boom, they benefitted from low bond yields
because their debt was secured by rest of Europe. This, however, lulled Greece into the perilous state of
false reassurance (Woods, 2012).

•

Absolutely no scope for devaluation

Many European countries have experienced rising labor costs, making exports uncompetitive. Most other
nations would like to devalue their currency to restore competitiveness, yet the European common
currency prevents them from devaluing this leads to record-breaking current account deficits, a fall in
exports and low growth as we have seen the case in Ireland and Greece. Excluding Germany, just over
half of all euro trade is with each other. Eurostat data has shown the stagnation the past few years. Thus,
there needs to be an increase in global trading because most European countries cannot afford to buy any
goods from each other.

•

No lender of the last resort

The ECB is unwilling to buy government bonds in the case of liquidity shortages, making markets more
nervous about holding debt from Eurozone economies. This is the problem in the case of Italy which has
exacerbated over the past few years despite having a much lower budget deficit.

•

Divergence in the bank rates

The recent credit crisis lead to rising bank rates in the peripheral Eurozone countries. Smaller firms faced
higher costs than ever (even after the ECB cut the main base rate), suggesting that the ECB was unable to
loosen the monetary policy when needed.
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•

Substantial financial interconnection

Cyprus owned Greek bonds, which caused issues for it, as a. The Financial Times’ infographic showed
the interconnection that allows anyone to see which country’s banks are exposed to which other country’s
debt across the entire Eurozone. For example, restructuring for Italy could result in tremendous loss for
the French economy.
It’s important also to do a cost-benefit calculation and explore basic economic concepts regarding the
effectiveness and feasibility of a sovereign monetary policy regarding EU’s institutional design.

•

Effectiveness of monetary policy

Can monetary policy systematically affect economic activity? The Keynesian economic theory states that
monetary policy can affect both the level and the variability of economic activity (Poole, 1970). The new
classical theory, however, insists that monetary policy has no systematic effects on the level of economic
policy but it “can and has” affected variability (Martino, 1997). The different perspectives are due to the
difference in the slope of the long run Phillips curve which traces the relationship between the
unemployment rate and inflation. Keynesian theory has a negatively sloped Phillips relation while the
new classical theory maintains a vertical relationship. In the Keynesian case, a negatively sloped Phillips
curve allows governments to use monetary policy to reduce the unemployment rate at the cost of higher
inflation. In the new classical theory, the vertical Phillips curve does not allow the monetary policy to
reduce permanently unemployment. Instead, it only produces high levels of inflation. This difference
between the two perspectives is crucial to the cost assessment of joining the EMU. There are significant
and potentially problematic costs of giving up sovereign monetary policy in the Keynesian view. On the
contrary, the new classical view suggests there to be a little benefit to having an independent sovereign
monetary policy.
The Keynesian case can be illustrated by two Phillips curves, the lower one representing
Germany and the upper one representing Greece. Before the EMU, the Greek economy maintains its
inflation at PG1 and unemployment at UG2 whereas Germany has inflation of PD and unemployment of

32
UD. If after the EMU is formed, the Germans control the new ECB and maintain their existing policies,
then the Greek economy would experience higher unemployment of UG2 and lower inflation equal to
Germany’s rate of PD. In the new classical case, initially, Greece has an inflation of PG1 and
unemployment of UG. The only change after the formation of the EMU, in this case, is that the Greek
inflation rate falls to the same level as the German rate.
These diagrammatic illustrations are crucial to understanding the fundamental significance of the
competing views to show the monetary policy may not be effective at all, depending on which economic
point of view you develop.
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3.3 Limitations of Fiscal Policy and its implications on EU
Fiscal policies are known to have a significant impact on macroeconomic stability, inflation and
economic growth. The key aspects are the composition of government expenditure and revenue, budget
deficits, and government debt thus the need for fiscal discipline is a pivotal element of the
macroeconomic stability. Moreover, in a monetary union, the need for fiscal discipline is even stronger. A
country entering the EMU surrenders its monetary policy, and its debt becomes denominated regarding a
currency over which it has no direct control. As the Eurozone faces a sustained debt crisis, the question
arises whether a monetary union can be completely viable without a fiscal union resurfacing. The
Eurozone came up with a few manageable solutions to the debt problems by engaging in a series of
measures and reforms that could strengthen European integration such as:
•

Expanding the size and powers of the EFSF (European Financial Stabilization Facility) created in
the wake of the Greek crisis in 2010

•

Establishing a permanent stabilization fund to replace the EFSF when it expired in 2013

•

Include private sector in funding the bailouts

•

Strengthening economic governance in the Eurozone

The creation of the EMU was criticized with the notion that countries could face asymmetrical
recessions and shocks and would not be able to exercise discretionary monetary policy nor would they be
able to devalue their currency. Government finances are under severe strain from the revenue and
spending side. On the revenue side, there is pressure worldwide to reduce corporate tax rates and on the
spending side; the aging of the population, rising health care costs and demand for public services are
straining public finances. Lack of coordination between the national fiscal policies may create a serious
threat to the single currency. The Eurozone should consider the adoption of a fiscal union which implies
that the budget should be higher than what it is today. The main characteristic of a fiscal union is the
capacity to spend subsequently to influence economic outcomes given that business cycles are not
uniform in different economies.
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Chapter 4
Greece and Ireland: Analysis and Comparison
The previous chapters, the literature review, and the European Union economics analysis, are
vital to understanding this project. Subchapter 2.1.1 offered detailed literature review on the economics of
austerity. Regardless of being poorly received throughout Europe, some countries manage to succeed and
overcome its financial struggles. Moreover, to understand why Greece is a weaker economy than Ireland
or to comprehend why the Irish have had an easier round of austerity measures than Greece, it’s important
to look at the history and the Maastricht Criteria (subchapter 2.1.2). It’s vital to understand the dynamics
within the EU as well as the major differences between the core and periphery countries. It’s important to
understand the fundamentals on which the entire Eurozone was built from inception. Through the
literature review, we find which countries benefit the most from this union and which countries were and
still would be better off if they were to switch back to their currencies, a topic which has sparked debates
around the world.
In subchapter 2.1.3, we analyze the timeline for both countries as well as the impact of the rescue
packages in both countries. This was perhaps held the most important information to be known as we can
clearly see the glaring differences of the packages.
In subchapter 2.1.4, we explored the differences between spending cuts and tax increases. This is
significant to understand the very different packages Greece and Ireland have received as well as their
effects. It is not about the possibility but the outcome and cost of fiscal adjustments on different
economies.
We further analyze and comprehend the relationship of the crisis to the EMU. Chapter 3 explored
the problems with the common currency, the institutional design of the EMU and the limitations of fiscal
policy and its implications for the European Union, specifically on Greece and Ireland. However, in this
chapter we analyze the different economies, government and culture of Greece and Ireland.
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4.1 Spider diagrams
Previously, in chapter 2, figures 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 are spider diagrams illustrating the comparison of
Ireland versus the Maastricht Criteria in 1999 and Greece versus the Maastricht Criteria in 2001. Hence,
earlier we examined the relative positioning of the 2 economies that are the subject of this thesis to the
Maastricht criteria when they joined the Union.
We will now examine the situation with diagrams for their relative positioning just on the cusp of
the beginning of the crisis years.
Figure 4.1.1 Maastricht Criteria Indicators for Ireland 200916
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Table 4.1.1 Maastricht Criteria Indicators for Ireland in 2009
Criteria

Maastricht Criteria

Ireland (2009)

(2009)

16

Data: Eurostat

Inflation Rate

2.4

4.06

Long Term Interest Rate

5.2

1.75

Government Budget Deficit

3

-13.8

Debt to Gdp /10

6

6.1

36
Figures 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, previously, showed the radial graphs of Maastricht Criteria vs Ireland and
Greece when they joined the Eurozone. Figures 4.1.1and 4.1.2, show the radial graphs for both countries
in 2009 compared to the Maastricht criteria. This is to show the difference between each country, both pre
and post crisis. Ireland, has a tremendous budget deficit which is skewing the radial graph down. It also
shows a dramatic reduction of long term interest rate although the debt to GDP ratio is nearly identical to
the Maastricht criteria. Moreover, the inflation rate is nearly double of what it should be, possibly due to
wage pressures.
Figure 4.1.2 Maastricht Indicators for Greece in 200917
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Table 4.1.2 Maastricht Indicators for Greece in 2009
Criteria

Maastricht Criteria (2009)

Greece (2009)

Inflation Rate

2.4

1.21

Long Term Interest Rate

5.2

8.1

Government Budget Deficit

3

-15.2

Debt to Gdp /10

6

12.67

17

Data: Eurostat
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Figure 4.1.1 shows an even more altered pattern compared to Figure 4.1.2. Greece is clearly the
worse scenario with a debt to GDP of over a double of the Maastricht criteria, a budget deficit five times
more exacerbated, a higher long term rate of interest and a lower inflation rate than the criteria. The most
alarming indicator is the debt to GDP. Although it was 126.7% in 2009, it kept climbing to a total of
178.6% by 2014.
We now cutover to 2013, post crisis years as it’s important to understand the differences between
those two economies and the region’s strongest economy Germany in terms of progression.

Table 4.1.3 Maastricht Criteria Indicators for EU, Ireland, Greece and Germany in 2013 18
Criteria

Maastricht Criteria

Ireland

Greece

Germany

Inflation Rate

2.7

0.2

-1.71

1.43

Long Term Interest Rate

2.96

3.828333

10.05417

1.57

Government Budget Deficit

-3

-5.658083927

-12.44587787

-0.110535234

Debt to Gdp /10

6

12

17.5

7.84

The table above shows the Maastricht criteria, Greece, Germany and Ireland in 2013. It’s easy to
see that the country that has the closest values to the Maastricht Criteria is Germany. With the exception
of debt to GDP and inflation rate, Ireland also has the closest values to the Maastricht criteria. However,
Greece clearly seems like an outlier. It has the highest debt to GDP, government budget deficit, deflation
and highest long term interest rate in 2013.

18

Data: Eurostat
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4.2 Why Greece and Ireland aren’t a good comparison
Ireland and Greece are clearly two very different countries with very different economies. There
is a large difference in the population levels, the tourism, work ethic, culture, exports, imports, previous
familiarities with the crisis, banking sectors, monetary financing, and that subjective element called the
‘innate perseverance and resilience of its citizenry how they reacted to adversity’ etc. A comparison
between both seem plausible; Ireland appears to be a good role model for Greece. However, there is a
need of rigorous economic analysis to comprehend both the economies.
Ireland’s austerity ‘success’ should not be seen as a role model for the Greek crisis. Throughout
Europe, Ireland is held up as an example, not just Greece but for all of the European nations that are
facing economic crisis. The Irish took the pain, engaged with the Troika and worked their way out of the
crisis to become one of the fastest growing economies within the EU. Ireland became the first crisisstricken country to exit the Eurozone bailout program three years after being saved from bankruptcy by
the Troika with a €67.5 billion loan. The crisis was described as the country’s worst economic period
since the notorious potato famine. To be honest Ireland learned little from the speculative boom and bust,
barely addressed its deficits in productive sectors, and in a way ignored or accepted stoically the profound
social costs that it imposed on itself. Moreover, Ireland’s finance minister stated that there must not be a
repeat of debt-fuelled property spree that brought the Celtic Tiger boom to a disastrous end.
“We cannot go mad again,” said Michael Noonan. The Irish success sends an important message
around Europe that with determination, and support any country can emerge stronger than it was before
the crisis. Ireland implemented all the spending cuts and structural reforms that were required under the
IMF bailout terms. Ireland has raised a sufficient amount of debt to independently fund itself into 2015
with over €20 billion. Moreover, as Noonan said: “This is not the end of the road. This is a very
significant milestone on the road”. He stated that the austerity measures must continue to drive down the
country’s enormous amount of debt.
The European Commission stated in its final report on Ireland’s progress under the rescue scheme
that “with public debt level at 124% of the GDP in 2013, Ireland needs to continue with fiscal
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consolidation, reduce private-sector debt overhang, and improve bank profitability to revive lending.”
However, Ireland had in actuality commenced its austerity programs in 2008 and accelerated it with four
budgets in two years. When the Troika intervened in Ireland, they did not have to impose a proper
program, hand down commands or enforce reforms. The Irish government itself was pushing its version
of austerity measures for two years before the Troika. Moreover, the Troika intervened in Ireland directly
to fund an already existing austerity program; they successfully became austerity’s lender of last resort
(Woodruff, 2005).
In Ireland, over €30 billion in austerity measures were introduced, including mostly public
spending cuts and some tax increases compromising of over 15% of GDP. However, as expected austerity
led to the slow demise of the Irish socio-economic life, employment, resulted in poverty, liquidations,
suicides. More than 32% of people lived in deprivation according to the Irish government, and one in ten
people were at risk of food poverty. A falling unemployment rate led to an increase in emigration, one in
seven young people have left the country.
Michael Taft of The Guardian states that Ireland, alone, is the beneficiary of:
…a fairly secret but very real policy of monetary financing. While
potentially illegal and certainly opposed by ECB and EU policy, Ireland is
actually paying off a substantial part of its debt to itself: Ireland’s Central
Bank took over the debt of the infamous Anglo Irish Bank, whose
speculative excesses cost the Irish economy nearly 20% of GDP when it
became insolvent. (2015)
It is well known that the Irish economy had taken on debts by taking over the liabilities
previously owed by privately-owned banks, a majority from the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation
(IRBC). When the Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide Building Society got into financial difficulties
a few decades ago, the Irish Central Bank (ICB) provided their joint successor, IRBC with the emergency
lending assistance program (ELA), which acts as a lender of last resort facility at a national level. The
cost of taking on these liabilities was around 22% of the Irish nominal GDP in 2011. Ireland’s debt-toGDP ratio in 2011 was 107 percent, however, without this event, it would have been roughly 85 percent,
in line with the Eurozone average. (Whelan, 2012). A significant amount of the funds provided by the
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government to the IBRC was used to pay off bondholders. It is worth stressing, however, that the amount
of IBRC bondholders remaining is small when compared with the total cost of bailing out these
institutions (Whelan, 2012).
The ELA is a form of a loan from the ICB with a penalty interest rate. However, since the money
is created outside the Eurozone system, the ECB monitors it extremely closely. Moreover, when the
government commenced restructuring banking assets, it needed to provide the Anglo-Nationwide
successor with assets that it could pledge as collateral for the ELA which came in the form of a
promissory note. On the first week of February 2013, the Irish parliament voted to liquidate the IBRC and
restructured the promissory note into a series of long-term bonds with maturities of between 25 to 40
years with lower interest rates. The main difference is that debt repayment is no longer front-loaded.
Without the rescheduling of promissory notes, the Irish economy would have fallen into an uncertain debt
trap. Moreover, the control on inflation would lead to the control of the debt. This is known as monetary
financing (Münchau, 2013).
If Greece had a similar deal, the cost of their debt would plummet. Under the terms of the Irish
bailout, the government was at liberty to implement whatever tax measures and spending cuts it deemed
fit for deficit reduction. Greece had no such freedom or autonomy. If Greece were to be properly
compared to Ireland, it’s vital they too experience such fiscal autonomy and experience monetary
financing for its mountain of debt.
In our example, we have two countries, Greece, and Ireland. One can raise money at an interest
above 1.5% from borrowers; the other remains locked out of markets. One has escaped austerity; the other
is still stuck with it. Ireland entered the crisis with a low debt level. Greece’s debt was already at danger
levels, way above the 60% debt-to-GDP ratio even before 2008. The Irish banks satiated itself with
available international funds post-euro, the availability of cash allowed the Greek government to keep
borrowing, regardless of their high debt.
However, Ireland’s success also requires a discussion about the effectiveness of its response to
financial crisis. The eight austerity budgets between 2008 and 2013 involved €18.5 billion in public
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spending cuts and €12 billion in tax revenue measures. Key public services such as health, housing and
security have diminished in quantity and quality. Public service employment have been reduced by 10%;
health spending has been cut by approximately 27% since 2008 resulting in a massive failure of
emergency services as well as general medical healthcare in Ireland. The Irish case actually points to the
economic and human need for debt relief and alternative approaches to fiscal crisis.
If we take a look and compare the historical data since the 1970s for Ireland, Greece, and
Germany--there is a stark difference. The table below shows the different GDP averages of the three
economies between 1970-79 and 1980-89.
Table 4.2.1: GDP averages between 1970-89 for Germany, Ireland and Greece19
Country/ Year

1970-89

1970-79

1980-89

$698,097

$415,961

$840,233

Ireland

$15,693

$8,349

$23,036

Greece

$30,939

$20,862

$41,017

Germany

Analyzing this, it’s clear that Germany was and remains the strongest nation in the Union
economically and there is hardly a comparison with the other two countries. However, as many critics
have stated previously that Ireland has been a stronger economy historically though is not entirely
accurate. In the 1970s, there were a series of major Irish bank strikes between 1966 to 1976 affecting the
banking sector. Moreover, there was an oil crisis of 1973 and 1979. By the 1980’s Ireland was referred to
as the ‘sick man of Europe’ Furthermore, the 1980s to early 1990s was known as the era of political
instability and corruption with power alternating between Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael until 1987 where
Ireland faced the “Tallaght Strategy”, with economic reform, tax cuts, welfare reform and a change in
current spending policies. Throughout this period, they had continuous support from the European Union.
As Greece entered the debt crisis, it did not have the same level of support, even if Greece has the biggest
sovereign debt default in history.
19

Data from National Account Statistics, United Nations (1993)
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Another aspect to look at is the difference in tourism and people. The table below records
information of tourism in the European Union according to the tourism highlights by the UNWTO (2015)
about international tourist arrivals in the European Union in 2014 as well as the international tourist
receipts in the same year.
Table 4.2.2: Tourist Arrivals and Tourism Receipts in 2014 for the European Union20
Destination

International Tourist

International Tourism

Arrivals 2014 (1000)

Receipts 2014 (US $million)

EUROPE UNION

458,740

422,873

Northern Europe

62,911

74,133

Ireland

826021

4,866

United Kingdom

32,613

45,262

Western Europe

164,936

153,632

Austria

25,291

20,559

France

87,300

55,402

Germany

33,005

43,326

Southern/Mediterranean Europe

163,092

159,254

Greece

22,033

17,793

Italy

48,576

45,545

Spain

64,995

65,187

Portugal

9,323

13,808

The area with most tourism are the Southern states of the European Union followed by Western
European Union states and then Northern European states. However, we shall focus on a select few
countries. Ireland accounts of 13.1% of Northern European Union arrivals while the United Kingdom
boasts of a mammoth 51.8%. In Western Europe, Austria has a share of 15.3%, Germany consists of 20%
while France takes the lion’s share of 52.9%. Lastly, in the Mediterranean/Southern Europe, Portugal and
Greece have the small shares of 5.7% and 13.5% respectively, while Italy and Spain bag the honors with
29.8% and 39.9% respectively. This shows a stark difference between tourism in the countries. The most

20
21

Data from UNWTO (2015), tourism highlights.
Note: Data for Ireland in 2014 is not available thus data is used from 2013
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visited locations are the United Kingdom (mostly England), France, Germany, Spain and Italy. Greece,
which depends majorly on tourism, has had a very low amount of international tourist arrivals compared
to the other countries. France, for example, has numerous cultural attractions and thus has the highest
international tourist arrivals. Although, approximately 33.6% of all tourists arriving in Europe go to the
southern hemisphere, only a small proportion go to Greece compared to Spain and Italy. When comparing
Greece to Ireland, out of all tourists visiting the European, only 1.8% go to Ireland and 4.8% go to
Greece. Regarding tourism receipts in 2014, 1.15% goes to Ireland and 4.2% goes to Greece whereas
other periphery nations such as Spain and Italy have a higher amount of international tourist receipts of
15% and 10.7% respectively. This information shows the background on the tourist industry in Europe.
This indicates a need for an increase in tourism in the periphery countries that are struggling the most. In
essence one can argue that Greece and Ireland are far smaller but at least in the case for Greece one can
argue that they have a huge potential to mine their significant historical importance and natural beauty as
well
Now let us turn our focus on another crucial economic pillar, imports and exports.
Appendices 5Ai, 5Aii, 6Ai, 6Aii contain the bubble diagrams illustrating the structure of Greek
exports, Greek imports, Irish exports and Irish imports respectively. There is clearly a stark difference in
the size and composition of trade profiles between both the countries. When compared to the core
countries, such as Germany whose primary export is manufacturing and vehicle, it’s clear that neither
Greece nor Ireland can easily create such a strong trade profile and unmatched manufacturing progress.
However, in subchapter 6.1 we discuss the reason the Irish export side is gaining strength. In terms of
trade profile, due to rising the international price of oil, there has been an increase in Greek exports
related to oil. However, non-oil related exports are still declining in Greece as they are not as price
competitive for competing nations.
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4.3 Analysis of Greek and Irish Packages
A crucial analysis is the comparison of the Greek and Irish austerity packages. Appendix 7A and
7B show a detailed account of the austerity packages for both Greece and Ireland respectively. An
analysis of both of the packages showed sheds some light into the situation.

Greece
The toughest austerity measures comprised of:
•

An increase in taxes

•

Luxury levies

•

Major cuts in public sector wages

•

Cuts in defense spending

•

Cuts in education spending

•

Decrease in social security

•

Government privatization

•

Retiring Civil Servants

•

Major cuts in healthcare

On the 9th of February in 2010, Greece started off with a minor, warning package to limit their
uncontrollable deficit. It was expected to save €0.8 million, freeze government employee salaries as well
as a 10% cut in bonuses and cuts in overtime workers, public employees, and work-related travels.
Shortly after, a package was put into motion to increase the government income after the emergence of
the Greek/German 10-year debt yield spread leading to the introduction of the “Economy Protection Bill”.
The Economy protection bill was expected to save approximately €4.8 billion by reducing public wages, a
cut in salaries and bonuses as well as an increase in VAT and other taxes. On the 23rd of April, 2010, the
Greek government requested the IMF to activate their bailout package. The third austerity package thus
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came as a result of the “First Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece” which aimed at saving €38
billion. In May, they reached their first loan agreement; Greece was to receive €110 billion with an
interest of 5% (comparatively high for a bailout package).
In response to this agreement, Greece rolled out a staggering final round of austerity measures as
described in Appendix 7A, which leads to nationwide strikes and massive protests leading to arrests,
injuries, and even deaths. This continued to leading to higher taxes. The taxes on electricity was seen as
one of the most problematic taxes according to Greek National Polls (Washington Post, 2015). People
refused to turn on lights or use electricity to prevent paying extra money for electricity tax when a
significant proportion of the population were facing pink slips or massive cuts in their disposable
incomes. Everyone was affected by the austerity measures, yet the bottom 75% of the citizenry faced
most of the consequences (including civil servants and retirees). The second bailout package was to
prevent sovereign default, which lead to a loan of €100 billion and 50% debt reduction through the private
sector involvement (PSI). As time progressed, there were more pink slips being handed out, higher taxes
and even more civil unrest.

Ireland
The toughest austerity measures comprised of:
•

Increase in taxes

•

Large benefit cuts to seniors

•

Cuts in public sector wages

•

Cuts in healthcare

•

Cuts in social security

It is apparent that from the very beginning of the crisis, the Irish government failed to protect
vulnerable people or ignore that section. Approximately €30 billion of austerity measures occurred since
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the beginning of the crisis. As the first country to enter into recession, investors fled due to fear of its debt
problems. In a belated attempt to convince investors to tackle its debts, in 2010 the Irish government
described a plethora of new measures aimed to drive sales taxes up, lower the minimum wage and reduce
government payrolls but as a resulting plunged the economy into a deeper economic crisis.
Ireland negotiated an estimated €80 billion bailout, €10 billion in spending cuts and €5 billion in
taxes over four years to reduce a budget deficit that is ten times the Eurozone limit. This in a way
backfired as it initially weakened the economy. Between 2008-2011, Ireland- suffering from a massive
banking crisis, had already slashed roughly 9% of its GDP. By the end of December 2011, the authorities
effectively kept the budget on track to meet its 2011 targets. Appendix 7B states Shinohara, the Deputy
Managing Director of the IMF stating that “Irish authorities have maintained resolute implementation on
their economic program…economy is showing signs of stabilization and financial market conditions have
recently…however, (Ireland) faces a weakening in treading partner growth.”.
The fifth review under the extended agreement with Ireland by the IMF states the changes in Irish
recovery. Irish authorities continue to advance their healthcare system, downsize their banking system
and as well as accomplishing disposition of their foreign assets were accomplished. This was seen as a
comprehensive strategy for insolvency reform. Despite weaker domestic demand, there was an increase in
employment and growth. The twelfth and final review under the extended fund facility arrangement for
Ireland was published on December 13th, 2013 and was due to expire on the 15th of December. Due to
their strict and steadfast policy implementation, the EU-IMF supported program was successful. Ireland
recovered from a notorious banking crisis and significantly improved its fiscal position. A range of
economic indicators suggest a slow but steady recovery although there are significant challenges
remaining.
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Comparison
A preliminary analysis of the austerity packages bring light to the differences both economies
faced. Greece was decimated by both spending cuts as well as tax increases. Furthermore, as discussed
later in the project, these austerity measures destabilized the economic welfare for the Greek economy.
Even according to the Irish CB Economist, Greece –without a doubt– ran the toughest austerity
measures in the Euro area. Hence, regardless of backlash faced by the Greek economy about their
inadequacy of the Greek reforms, Greece did have, the most ambitious goals as far as austerity measure
went but their hand was forced due to their being the more problematic situation. The Greek packages
compromised higher taxes, more spending cuts and more forced unemployment than the Irish packages.
Ireland was given an ultimatum and by appropriate policy implementation they succeeded as the first to
enter and first to exit the crisis. However, Ireland entered the crisis with a large deficit due to the banking
sector- compared to Greece, Ireland had much easier circumstances to manage entering the crisis in part
to their starting austerity measures of their own volition in the immediate years before the crisis.
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Chapter 5
The Cambridge Keynesian and Modern Money School Literature
The central idea of the Maastricht Treaty is that the EC countries should move towards an economic and
monetary union, with a single currency managed by an independent central bank. But how is the rest of
economic policy to be run? As the treaty proposes no new institutions other than a European bank, its
sponsors must suppose that nothing more is needed. But this could only be correct if modern economics
were self-adjusting systems that didn’t need any management at all.
-Wynne Godley (1992)
This project uses key concepts from the Modern Monetary Theory (MMT). MMT is a relatively
new approach that builds on the insights of John Maynard Keynes, Georg F. Knapp, Karl Marx, Abba
Lerner, A. Mitchell Innes, Hyman Minsky, Wynne Godley, Randall Wray and many others. There is an
importance in discussing this theory for the purposes of this project as it spans across a vast array of subdisciplines of economics such as: history of thought, economic history, monetary theory, unemployment,
poverty, finance, sectoral balances, economic cycles and government policies (Wray, 2012). MMT has
made various contributions to our understanding of the relationship between the treasury, and central
bank, the importance of understanding the government finance, taxation, the liabilities pyramid, and
others. It places large importance on reducing unemployment and maintaining price stability and
relatively little on targeting government debts or deficits.
After the global economic crisis, household activity retrenched, leading to a sharp increase in
savings and a slow down in economic growth. The high propensity to save was due to a significant level
of unemployment and lower incomes of those lucky enough to keep their jobs. This lead to a rapid
increase in budget deficits due to the automatic stabilizers. In Europe there was a push to reduce the
government sector deficit toward more acceptable levels in lockstep with Maastricht criteria. This was
accompanied by a reduction in private sector surpluses and an increase whenever possible in current
account surpluses. Periphery countries such as Ireland and Greece remained net importers for some time,
meaning that the reduction in the private sector balance had to be that much greater. Throughout this
process this increase in taxes and reduction in spending to tackle rising deficits proved to be detrimental
to economic growth.
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Sectoral Balances
This project studies the problems of a common currency by analyzing the relationship between
three sector balances elaborated in chapter 5. The crucial accounting principle that motivates this research
is the following (Godley, 1999):

𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 0

This identity illustrates that when one sector runs a budget surplus than at least one other sector
must run a deficit. Similarly, if a sector is running a budget deficit, at least one other sector must run a
surplus. Moreover, the liabilities of one sector must also equal the financial assets of the remaining. One
sector cannot issue debt if another sector is not willing to take up or accumulate these debt instruments.
Furthermore, the three sector balances must always balance out to zero, meaning that a change in one of
the balances is impossible without a corresponding balancing change elsewhere.
Another goal of national accounting is to see the relationship between different sectors. Wray
(2012) uses the bathtub analogy to arrive at the National Income and Products Accounts accounting
identity is as follows:
𝑆 ≡ 𝐺−𝑇
S= Private sector savings
G=Government expenditure on goods and services
T= Taxes
Private sector savings, by definition, is true by identity and equal to the size of the fiscal deficit.
After adding the firms to the household sector and the foreign sector, which Wray describes as ‘adding
another faucet,' the identity becomes:

𝑆 ≡ 𝐺 − 𝑇 + 𝐼 + 𝑁𝑋
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I= Private domestic investment
NX=Net Exports

Through the sectoral balances the MMT can also illustrate the well know Keynesian “paradox of
thrift” effect. Household income determines spending at the individual level but in the aggregate, total
spending determines total income. If due to an economic crash (for example as in Greece), households
spend less in order to save more, aggregate consumption would fall. Firms would reduce output, lay off
workers and cut wages, leading to lower disposable income. Keynes’s theory states that trying to save
more by reducing aggregate consumption will reduce incomes.
The first pillar of the modern money approach is the sectoral balances, the second pertains to the
nature of the currency. The Eurozone is an example of a non-sovereign currency regime where member
states of the Eurozone are users instead of issuers of the currency (the Euro). Historically, there have been
very few examples where politically sovereign nations have shared a common currency.
The EMU countries abandoned their own currency in favor of using the Euro. Monetary policy
including the overnight interbank interest rate is set by the ECB for the Eurozone as a whole. Domestic
fiscal policy is still left in the hands of individual nation states but the policy space is drastically reduced
by separating the individual fiscal authorities from the monetary authorities. Fiscal policy was limited by
the design according to the Maastricht Criteria (Wray, 2012). This was a disciplinarian action to assure
that member states were kept in line. However, it is important to note that some EU member’s budget
deficits moved beyond the Maastricht limits due to external conditions.
What happens if a whole country – a potential ‘region’ in a fully integrated
community – suffers a structural setback? So long as it is a sovereign state, it can
devalue its currency. It can then trade successfully at full employment provided its
people accept the necessary cut in their real incomes. With an economic and
monetary union, this recourse is obviously barred, and its prospect is grave indeed
unless federal budgeting arrangements are made which fulfil a redistributive role… If
a country or region has no power to devalue, and if it is not the beneficiary of a
system of fiscal equalization, then there is nothing to stop it suffering a process of
cumulative and terminal decline leading, in the end, to emigration as the only
alternative to poverty or starvation. (Wynne Godley 1992:176)
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As Godley (1992) states above, a sovereign currency nation does not have the straightjacket of
Eurozone nation states when a crisis hits. When the monetary union was formed, states abandoned their
own monetary unit in favor of a common unit. However, this abandonment deprived them of control over
their own money supply (Afxentiou, 2000). They yielded control to a central bank, ECB, whose concern
was the common interest of the entire European Union rather than the economic struggles of an individual
economy.
Unlike the American economy, where the states are required to submit their balanced budgets
which at the end of the fiscal year may either be lower or higher than anticipated, the different states (48
states) are able to borrow, use bonds and tax revenues to service debt. The European Union, tried to
reduce the possibility of debt problems among their nations by using guidelines stating that no national
government should run a budget deficit greater than 3% of the GDP and no government debt higher than
60% of the GDP. The main difference is that in the US there is counter-fiscal policy for the country as a
whole where the central bank will buy government debt as needed basis. No such mechanism exists in
Europe. The MMT scholarship had accurately predicted that the structure of the European Union would
automatically lead to financial crisis, this, of course became clear when Greece and Ireland faced the
brunt of the global financial crisis.
As of today, the financial crunch still percolates throughout some of the periphery countries.
After the GFC, these countries faced severe debt problems. The markets pushed their interest rates on
debt higher than GDP growth rate (Wray, 2012) leading to intervention by the Troika causing a lot of
complications between the periphery states and the core countries. Nations such as Germany, Finland,
Netherlands and France often blamed the “profligate” neighbors that reportedly ran ‘irresponsible fiscal
policy’ as well as having irresponsibly high debt levels (Wray, 2012). The problem, however, lies with
the institutional design.
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Figure 5.1.1 Government Debt as a percentage of GDP, 1995-201422

Figure 5.1.2 General Government Deficit, 1995-201423
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Source: Wray (2012). Data: Eurostat
Source: Wray (2012). Data: Eurostat
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Figures 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 above show total government debt and deficit as a percentage of GDP
respectively. This is done to give an idea of the massive differences between the core and periphery
countries. Italy, Portugal and especially Greece had a historically higher debt to GDP than what was
allowed by the Eurozone criteria. Greece, in particular, manipulated the budget numbers and entered
under false pretenses. Figure 5.1.2 shows Ireland having the historically largest deficit24 which will be
examined through our sectoral balances framework. Table 2.1.2 (see chapter 2) showed that these
countries had difficulty fulfilling their Maastricht criteria which raises a question: were some countries
doomed from the beginning?
Since each nation has adopted the Euro, the exchange rates were fixed among countries within the
monetary union. Greece, Spain, and Italy, for example, were less successful at controlling inflation,
especially wage inflation compared to the core countries (Bruegel, 2011). As a result, they ran constant
trade deficits, especially with Germany. Wray discusses the importance of grasping the concept of MMT
to fully understand the situation in Europe.
Germany could (rightfully) point to “profligate” spending by the government and
private sector of Greece, and Greece could (rightfully) blame Germany for its
“mercantilist” trade policy that relied on trade surpluses. Germany was able to
keep its budgets deficits low and its private sector savings high, by relying on its
neighbors to keep the German economy growing through exports. But that meant,
in turn, that its neighbors were building up debts- both public and private- and
eventually markets reacted to that with credit downgrades. (Wray 2012: 183)
As Wray states above, there is no individual culprit. The European Union itself as an
establishment was flawed from the very beginning. The stark difference between the core and periphery
economies running under the same monetary policy and currency itself was the biggest problem. Further
analysis of sectoral balances for Greece, Ireland and Germany is offered in the following chapter.

24

Note: large deficit due to banking crisis, elaborated in the Irish sectoral balances
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Chapter 6
The Sectoral Balances
The sectoral balances approach is essential to understand the weaknesses and fragility of other
financial systems. In this section, we calculate the sectoral balances for Greece and Ireland as well as
represent them using the Parenteau model. It is impossible to fully study public debts and deficits in
isolation from the private sector financial conditions. The sectoral balances allow us to explore this
connection as we study the economic conditions. We stress the importance of the foreign position of each
country in meeting deficit criteria.

6.1 The Three Sector Balances
6.1.1 Greece
Figure 6.1.1: Greece Sectoral Balances between 2004-201425
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The sectoral balances for Greece perfectly illustrate the fact that Greece cannot meet its external
debt commitments based solely on the imposition of austerity measures. As the IMF proposed to the
government to cut down on their deficits, the Greek private sector (households and firms) had to pay the
price. As seen, between 2004 to 2011, the foreign sector surplus shows the position of the Greek economy
as a net importer. Having a consistently large foreign sector surplus and a lower private sector balance
through the mentioned years (except 2008) illustrates the reality of the economy. They spend more on
foreign goods (from countries such as Germany) compared to having a large production of the same
products domestically. Although Greece is still facing the backlash from the crisis, from the beginning of
2012, the private sector balance has been increasing moderately. This is because of the paradox of thrift,
people have increased savings and reduced consumption. For Greece to become a net exporter, there
needs to be a large decrease in the foreign sector balance and less of dependence on foreign goods and
services. However, as we compare the Greek sectoral balances to the German sectoral balances, it’s
evident that Greece to become less dependent on imports. If Greece were to comply and implement all
suggested structural reforms (such as health, tax revenue collection and energy reform) as well as improve
the liquidity and financial conditions of the banking sector (OECD, 2016), there would be an increase in
confidence leading to faster economic recovery.
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6.1.2 Ireland
Figure 6.1.2: Ireland Sectoral Balances between 1999 and 201426
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Firstly, the Irish sectoral balances contain an aberration. As mentioned earlier, in 2010 the
government deficit quickly rose to -32.3% of GDP, drastically higher than the Maastricht Criteria. Many
investors were skeptical as Ireland pledged to reduce its deficit drastically. The banking crisis in Ireland
forced the government to require external assistance including approximately €35 billion, a large part of
which was directed to the Irish banks to bulk up their balance sheet and mitigate any further problems
with future loan losses as well as the cost of completely restructuring, preserving and shrinking their
operations (World Economic Outlook, 2015). The main concern during the crisis years, especially in 2010

26

Data: Eurostat
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was whether revenue from the export side is strong enough to compensate the severe shortfall on the
domestic side. Ireland, compared to Greece, has less of dependence on imports and is, therefore, less of a
net importer. The foreign sector balance for Ireland seems to be smaller in size and has only faced notable
surpluses between 2005 to 2012. Ireland clearly had an enormous deficit problem during crisis years, and
although it has adjusted to its demand- it has a much smaller deficit of -3.9% which is heading towards
the Maastricht Criteria limit. The Irish people have increasingly become more ‘autonomous’ and have
bought domestic goods than foreign goods which can be seen as the foreign sector balance starts
shrinking from 2007, and is now facing a foreign sector deficit, exploring benefits as a net exporter unlike
Greece.
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6.1.3 Germany
Figure 6.1.3 Germany Sectoral Balances Between 1999 and 201427
15.0

10.0

5.0

0.0
1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

-5.0

-10.0

-15.0
Government Deficit

Foreign Sector Balance

Private Sector Balance

Germany’s anemic pace of domestic demand growth and dependence on exports
have hampered rebalancing at a time the many other euro-area countries have
been under severe pressure to curb demand and compress imports in order to
promote adjustment. The net result has been a deflationary bias for the euro area
as well as for the world economy. (The U.S. Treasury 2013)
In response to the U.S Treasury’s comments, ‘The trade surpluses reflect the strong
competitiveness of the German economy and the international demand for quality products from
Germany’ (Wall Street Journal, 2013). The German economy has consistently been running high current
account surpluses for over ten years, especially after the introduction of the Euro in 1999. In 2013, the
IMF advised ‘stronger and more balanced growth in Germany…critical to a lasting recovery in the euro

27

Data: Eurostat
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area and global rebalancing.' Their notorious position as the European net-exporter is evidently
discernible. The private sector balance consecutively runs surpluses. Current account surpluses in
Germany are seen as a controversial feature of Germany’s macroeconomic landscape since the
reunification. It is evident from the sectoral balances that the private sector is strong. Perhaps this is why
even through severe recession throughout the world, the German CA surplus just faced a small dent in the
fourth quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009.
Moreover, capital flows to the Euro area fell abruptly, but the overall current account surplus
quickly bounced back and reached its record peak of 7%. As a result, Germany became a major surplus
country globally. Even though Germany has not had the need to implement such severe austerity
measures, during the ‘Hartz’ reforms in 2003-2005, the German government implemented a ‘far-reaching
labor market deregulation…including a reduction in unemployment benefits and measures such as reorganization of labor placement and of job training schemes to improve job matching.’(Kollman, 2006)
Germany itself, decided to impose certain structural changes and change in regular policies, however,
Greece and Ireland did not have that freedom of choice. Greece was constantly told by the IMF to fix
their budget, which led to a deeper crisis, which again led to the IMF implementing, even more, stricter
cuts and taxes.
Greece’s crisis involves long-term fiscal mismanagement with large systematic deficits, even
during boom periods. The Irish crisis is a property bubble that burst, creating chaos for the banking
system. Ireland had budget surpluses during the boom, largely based on revenues from the infamous
property bubble. The next chapter further analyzes the Irish and Greek economies as we know it today,
before providing policy implications.
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6.2 The Parenteau Model
Economist Robert Parenteau develops the Parenteau Model to diagrammatically illustrate policy
space countries have to achieve their fiscal objectives. Figure 6.2.1 below, represents the Parenteau curve
for Greece, Ireland, and Germany in the years of 2001, 2009 and 2014. The Diagram includes a line
indicating the Maastricht criteria. The Stability and Growth Pact was agreed to create a semblance of
stability throughout the member states. However, ironically, it was the very source of the financial
instability (Bibow, 2012). The Parenteau curve for Ireland, Greece, and Germany show that in 2001,
Ireland and Greece were on the left of the 45-degree line which represented the range of all possible
combinations where the domestic private sector is neither issuing financial liabilities nor accumulating
assets. Ireland had a fiscal surplus as well as slight current account surplus whereas Greece, shortly after
entering, had a current account and fiscal deficit. Germany, however, had a current account deficit of 3.1%, close to the Maastricht criteria and an acceptable fiscal surplus of 0.4%. As the crisis hit, Greece
and Ireland were forced to implement austerity policies which have only caused their sectors to retrench,
compress demand and cut wages. This causes a significant change in the position of Greece and Ireland
on the diagram, especially Greece since its economy was hit the hardest. Greece now has both a current
account deficit -12.4% as well as a fiscal deficit of -15.2%. Ireland has a smaller current account deficit of
-4.2% and a fiscal deficit of -13.8% which increases tremendously over the third and fourth quarter
heading into 2010 due to large bank bailout costs related to the Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide
Building Society. Germany, however, had a current account surplus and a fiscal deficit of -3.2- again,
close to the criteria limits. Evidently, Greece faced the brunt of the crisis in this particular scenario. Most
recently, in 2014 Ireland’s banking sector strengthened, leading to a positive current account balance as
well as a fiscal deficit of -3.9, not far off from the Maastricht criteria. Germany had the economically
strongest economy in 2014 and thus had both a current account surplus as well as a fiscal surplus.
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Figure 6.2.1: The Parenteau Model for Greece, Ireland and Germany for 2001, 2009, 201428
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The German economy raised a lot of concerns around the globe since other countries were going
through deep recessions and crisis while Germany consecutively ran current account surpluses. As the net
exporter, Germany would be expected to have a current account surplus and has since the introduction of
the Euro. Moreover, specifically because of lower import spending, the German people would seem to be
spending more of their disposable income on domestic goods rather than foreign goods. Furthermore,
Ireland’s location on the model also resembles the data points of an economy that is a net-exporter
(except momentarily in 2009). Greece, however, is constantly a net-importer. However, accessing the
cross-border financial account (the mirror image of the current account), depicts the savings and
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20

62
investment decisions in Germany. (WEO, 2015). From this point of view, it indicates that the German
economy has invested a relatively large percentage of its savings abroad. Moreover, because of the Euro,
due to increased competitiveness of German products and its considerable global export outreach,
Germany has an export sector which is the backbone of its ‘robust economy’. Without strong export
demand, the German economy would be much weaker and would be liable to have high unemployment
rates. As a net importer, Greece will have current account deficits. Whereas Ireland benefits from a net
exporter position. Export growth is beneficial to the current account as domestic demand and imports
recover. Moreover, if compared to the German economy, their products are much less competitive and
less likely to be purchased over a German good in foreign markets. The shaded triangle shows the little
area where a country that is a net importer should reside in if they want to achieve savings for the private
sector.
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Chapter 7
Life After Austerity
This is taking place inside Europe. This is taking place inside a once great nation. The nation that
invented democracy. We are on the edge of total social breakdown. And frankly, as far as the euro is
concerned and the austerity measures are concerned, the medicine is killing the patient.
-Nigel Farage (2012)
This chapter focuses on analyzing both the economies after the financial crisis. Ireland has
experienced a rebound while Greece is still trying to claw its way out of this crisis.

Figure 7.1.1: Economic Welfare Levels for Greece and Ireland compared to the OECD_29
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Figure 7.1.1, above, is a radar diagram showing several indicators of economic welfare levels for
Greece, Ireland, and the OECD. The green bar shows that Ireland has a higher value than the OECD
average in many cases (for everything except income and wealth and jobs and earnings). Comparatively,
well-being in Greece is significantly below the OECD average in several dimensions except education
and skills as well as personal security. When we compare between Ireland and Greece, the blue line is
almost always below the green line. The fact therefore is that Ireland is currently much more
economically stable than Greece, whilst the latter has had damaging effects to social welfare and social
psychology after undergoing multiple rounds tough of austerity measures. The Maastricht criteria
constrains member states’ fiscal policy by design. Ireland exited the crisis in 2013, however, their
‘success’ was in part due to the relatively small size of fiscal contraction, the rebuilding of private sector
savings, and the return to a net-exporting position. Ireland was able to exit the crisis because there existed
a smaller need for structural reform. Visibly, Greece’s adjustment was much more severe and had more
devastating effects on the economy. Moreover, the private sector financial position never fully recovered,
and the country remained in a net-importing position little space to achieve its’ fiscal objectives.
Figure 7.1.2: Long-term Unemployment for numerous OECD countries30
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Figure 7.1.2 above shows the OECD averages for the long-term unemployment. Again, Greece
(blue) is at the top with 73%; Ireland is towards the higher side with 59.2% and to compare Germany is at
44.7%. A high rate of long-term unemployment can adversely affect families, people, and the economy.
Depreciation of human capital increases as time passes. Potential wages the unemployed could have
earned by finding a new job keeps decreasing their chances of getting a new job due to loss of skill and
increasing employability. In the cases of countries that have had damaging effects of austerity measures
such as Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal, the youth unemployment is steadily declining. Due to lack of
mobility within the Eurozone, young people of these particular countries cannot automatically or easily
find jobs. Figure 7.1.3, below, shows the slow increase in unemployment between 2000 to 2008 after
which there is a constant increase in the periphery countries although the European Union average stays
stagnant between 15-25% during the GFC.
Figure 7.1.3 Youth unemployment levels for Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland compared to the
European Union levels31
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7.1 Celtic Tiger: Battered then Blooming
Examining the recent data, it is clear that Ireland has experienced an extraordinary economic
recovery over the past two years. After being one of the most severely affected economies by the crisis
with an output contraction of almost 7% between 2007 and 2010, Ireland enforced a wide-ranging and
problematically ambitious series of reforms and cuts with the support of the Troika program of financial
assistance. The successful implementation of these austerity measures by the Irish authorities laid the
framework for a successful role model for the rest of the Eurozone crisis-stricken areas. Ireland has
become the fastest growing economy in 2014, 2015 and 2016, a trend that is optimistic and forecasted to
keep following the aforementioned pattern. The reforms recommended under the Troika intervention
were primarily focused on the repair of the financial sector and restructuring fiscal sustainability and
competitiveness. The recovery has supported the economic rebalancing process and sustained full-time
job creations throughout a vast array of sectors and regions, leading to a slow yet stable decline of the
unemployment rate and a reduction in long-term and youth unemployment. An amalgamation of output
and corporate profits transmutes into stronger tax revenues through rippling corporate income tax receipts
and overreaching the fiscal targets proposed. The recovery predominantly accelerated in 2015, with
domestic demand overtaking net exports as the chief driver of growth. Although these extraordinary
results are commendable, the main challenge for Ireland is to ensure durable, sustainable and balanced
growth in its future years, matching its optimistic predictions. As some skeptic economists converse about
the growth figures that overestimate the strength of the recovery, Ireland is facing a ‘booming’ economy.
However, as Yves Smith mentions ‘the word “boom” is usually synonymous with bubble’
(Smith, 2016), in this case, a corporate tax bubble. There is an increased necessity of fostering sustainable
high growth as well as promoting durability and lack of volatility which is inherent to a small open
economy through successively prudent macroeconomic policies. Ireland’s main concerns are enhancing
its resilience by moving towards a balanced budget in structural terms to reduce the high public debt as
well as strengthening their shaky banking sector. Moreover, there needs to be an increase in labor market
participation as well as efforts to increase literacy, unemployment, and long-term unemployment. Finally,
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they need to improve long-term economic growth prospects by fostering and providing assistance to Irishowned businesses to provide more dynamic and productive results to increase foreign investments.

Economic Growth and Jobs
Appendix 2B shows the vigorously accelerating recovery that began in the last quarter of 2013,
exceeding even the most optimistic expectations. Initially driven by exports, the recovery is now well
anchored on domestic demand, spreading across sectors. The prompt recovery has lead to vigorous job
creation. As of 2014, private sector employees have benefited from an increase in wages throughout
different professions. The previous public sector wage cuts ‘will be partially reversed in 2016’ (OECD
Economic Surveys, 2015). Moreover, high economic growth pulled the unemployment rate below the EU
average, after Ireland added more than 135,000 jobs in the third quarter.
The “Lansdowne Road” wage agreement with public sector unions added about
€300 million to spending in 2016 An additional €470 million was allocated to
education and social protection budgets for early education, new teaching posts,
higher state pensions, and larger child benefits. Also announced was a 50 cent
increase in the minimum hourly wage (an increase of about 6 percent). These
measures aim to cement the recovery by supporting job growth and to ensure
that the benefits of a growing economy are shared with the broader population
after years of sacrifice. (IMF 2016)
The above quote by the IMF speaks of the importance of the economic recovery on the economy,
specifically in the employment sector. An increase in employment and much awaited increase in wages
support consumer confidence and in turn cause an increase in consumption, leading to an inflow of
income into the economy through injections and growing production to match the increased demands.
Households seemingly have been reducing their savings and increased their consumption, thus signaling
confidence in the state of their personal well being and future security thus bolstering the economy
without any significant credit expansions. Strong private sector reflects international and domestic
confidence in the Irish nation. However, despite the strength and magnitude of the economic recovery and
its results in job creation, labor market participation has remained relatively stagnant.
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Figure 7.1.4 Real Household Disposable Income vs. real Household Consumption for Ireland32
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Figure 7.1.4 above shows the real disposable income for households (RDIH) in Ireland compared
to the real household consumption (RHC). As economic growth is booming recently, both the RDIH and
RHC have been slowly increasing showing an increase in consumer confidence. Moreover, it’s evident
during the crisis the detrimental effects of austerity on household consumption leading to mass significant
hoarding of savings by household. Lastly, levels of RDIH and RHC were both mostly increasing before
and after the crisis.
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Investment and trade
Investment is playing a central and vital role in the Irish recovery. Investment grew
approximately 11.7% in the first three quarters of 2015. With a rapidly increasing real GDP growth rate,
Ireland is becoming an increasingly attractive import destination with high net foreign direct interments.
This influx of investment directly correlates to job creation and to the economic development.
Figure 7.1.5 Ireland Exports Competitiveness33
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Figure 7.1.5, above, show an increase in competitiveness of Irish exports, as unit labor costs
become more stagnant, there is a rapid increase of the export market performance. The strong export
performance has been incredibly beneficial to the economy. As Appendix 6Ai shows Ireland’s
specialization in pharmaceuticals lead to an increase of demand for their exports throughout the globe. As
Figure 6.1.2 show, Ireland has been facing a foreign sector deficit, thus the economy commences a
possible era as a net exporter.
However, in the case of Irish exports, a large chunk of exports are services by companies with
headquarters in Ireland such as Seagate Technology, Accenture, Covidien. These companies usually
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devote massive amounts of their profits into research and development, which is an enormous advantage
as Ireland leaves Eurozone behind as their exports boom.

Banking Sector
As confirmed by the positive outcome of the ECB’s current account, the Irish domestic banks’
performance is gradually improving, steering away from being its most problematic sector. Domestic
banks commenced generating profits in 2014 for the first time since the beginning of the crisis.
‘Achieving durable bank profitability while maintaining prudent lending practices remains a central
challenge’ (IMF, 2016). All the Irish banks (BOI, AIB, PTSB, Ulster Bank and Merrill Lynch) passed the
asset quality review (AQR) and the baseline stress test (except for PTSB). The banks on a whole are
stronger, indicating high profitability indicators for domestic banks continuing to widen profit margins.
The local banks are taking advantage of the ECB’s new targeted long-term refinancing operations,
helping extend the average duration of their liabilities and lower average funding costs. The banks have
obviously benefited from favorable market conditions and is predicted by the ECB to continue doing so
and not be a significant threat to the economy.

Government and Public Finances
It’s evident from the analysis of the sectoral balances for Ireland that current account surpluses
have become established. This was due to regained competitiveness and a shift in resources towards the
trade sectors and a significant contraction in domestic demand. As the foreign sector matures, households
do not have the same spending capacity as before, thus the domestic economy outside the export sector
has received the same benefits. Although exports are a tremendous benefit to the economy, the average
Irish citizen is no longer able to spend the same amount of money to upkeep their past standards of living.
VAT, income taxes and corporate taxes throughout 2015 were increasing consistently with a
robust labor market. On the expenditure side, there has been an increase in healthcare reform following
detrimental effects on healthcare due to the strict austerity measures, thus current expenditures were

71
around 0.7% above the target through November 2015 (ECB, 2016). As a result of overspending, the
deficit is likely to be higher than expected but still within the expected norms. Despite some of the
expansionary measures (consisting of tax cuts and expenditure increases) in the budget for the year of
2015, Ireland has complied with its provisions of the SGP, albeit by a very narrow margin.
Ireland’s fiscal position is expected to improve further if they manage current conditions shown
in the sectoral balances. Gross general government debt is projected by the ECB to fall to 106% of the
GDP in 2016 (down from 123.3% in 2013). This forecasted value, according to the ECB, is primarily
reflecting the accounting treatment of the IRBC.
The overall health of the economy is improving, with high growth rates and less of reliance on imports,
the worst is over. However, as mentioned earlier, the government should be cautious of the private sector
fomenting trouble.

Compliance with Country Specific Recommendations
Appendix 8A shows that Ireland has overall made progress in addressing the 2015 country-specific
recommendations including (but not limited to):
•

A reduction of debt by the households

•

A marked fall in gross government debt ratio

•

Active deleveraging by companies

•

Restructuring domestic banks to prevent financial sector vulnerabilities

•

Control of vulnerabilities of the debt ratio (which is still high)

•

A decrease in non-performing loans (although Ireland still has the highest ratio amongst the other
Eurozone countries)

•

A strengthening of the external account

•

A fall in unemployment (although long term unemployment is still a concern)
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In general, Ireland has made limited progress in addressing its country specific recommendations.
Although it has made no progress in limiting discretionary powers to change expenditure ceilings, it has
seen some progress in a variety of areas including; the cost-effectiveness of healthcare; broadening the tax
base; increasing the work intensity of households; addressing the poverty risk of children; tapering
benefits; improving access to childcare; finalizing durable restructuring solutions to its banking sectors
and setting up credit registry, it continues to proceed down the right path though it has a long way to go in
order to completely be at line with its 2020 national targets. Ireland may seem to be doing well, however,
they have a lot of organization and restructuring to do in order to meet their targets.
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7.2 Hellenic Republic: reeling yet recovering
The Greek economy is gradually recovering from a deep recession, this comes however, at an
enormous social costs are alarmingly high. Analyzing the Parenteau model for the economy as well as the
sectoral balances, Greece has not faced the same amount of success as Ireland. On the Parenteau model,
Greece is not in the little area provided where a net-importer who wants to achieve positive savings for a
private sector expansion. Greece has a net importer position as a small economy that majorly relies on
tourism.
To recollect, after Greece adopted the euro in 2001, low-interest rates fuelled a rapid credit
growth, high economic growth, and rising incomes, however, it also distorted Greece’s fiscal position.
Now under the aegis of the IMF programs, public debt has been restructured; there have been significant
fiscal adjustments and structural reforms as well as an increase in taxes which seem to have bolstered
strengthened the long-term prospects of the economy.
The GDP fell nearly 26% after the crisis, and though economy is now slowly growing, a full
recovery will take time. The IMF predicts that 2016 and 2017 shall be positive years for Greek economic
growth. There has, of course, been an increase in competitiveness but as the sectoral balances show us,
the exports and investment sector remain exceedingly weak. The unemployment rate is high at 25.6%,
although that is a marked decrease from the rates were seen in May 2013. The average citizens of Greece
were most affected by this crisis, facing brutal tax increases in almost everything, lower demand for the
average small business owner and a series of devastating reforms. Although tax and benefit reforms have
materially improved the budget, public debt is still extremely high. The banking sector has recently been
recapitalized but ‘credit creation remains weak due to the high burden of non-performing loans on banks’
balance sheets, and reduced demand for loans’ (OECD, 2016). Greece has implemented significant labor
market reforms to remedy further the health of the economy, including a reduction in monopoly and
oligopoly power as well as a decrease in bureaucracy, corruption and weaknesses in public
administration.
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The social costs of the prolonged recession and additional economic austerity packages lead to
unemployment, a decline in healthcare, civil unrest, a decrease in social security and mass poverty
throughout Greece. The decline in household income and a lack of social safety and security led to a rapid
increase in poverty. Anchored poverty i.e., measuring poverty about its pre-crisis income level almost
tripled during the crisis years due to mass unemployment.
For Greece, stronger exports and investment are crucial for its recovery as well as an increased
reform of health care, restoring sustainability and protection for the vulnerable to counteract all the
detrimental effects austerity has had on the economy and its people.

Economic Growth and Jobs
As mentioned previously, there is an increased need for structural reform to increase growth and
raise export levels. Exports are a key to raising growth and incomes. Obviously, boosting economic
growth is fundamental for reducing poverty and unemployment. Fully implementing all the key structural
reforms, especially those concerning economic welfare, would boost output over the following decades.
This would also lead to countless and needed jobs and pave the road for better social security. Appendix
2A shows Greece’s predicted and actual GDP. Clearly, the predictions were incredibly optimistic as
Greece is well below those projections. Stronger economic growth would make the debt burden more
sustainable.
Pre-crisis Greece had one of the most restrictive employment protection legislations in the OECD
(OECD Economic Surveys, 2016). This included long notice periods, large severance payments and a
reduced job allocation and creation processes. The minimum wage in Greece increases with seniority (an
incredibly unique case in the Eurozone) thus the minimum wage of workers without experience is
relatively low compared to the rest of the Eurozone (however, Ireland, surprisingly, has a lower minimum
wage than Greece). There is a need for extensive amendment of the minimum wage law for Greece.
Appendix 9A shows the minimum wages for all OECD countries and their average. Figure 6.2.1, below
shows Greek revenues and expenditures. It’s visually apparent that the economy spends more than they
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earn and is projected to continue doing so, this is another one of many suggestions for the Greek economy
to correct.
Figure 7.2.1 Greek Revenues and Expenditures34
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Investment and exports
After Greece had adopted the euro, low-interest rates fuelled rapid credit growth, high economic
growth as well as rising incomes, however, it also distorted risk assessments and led to a severe
deterioration of the fiscal positions, largely reflecting rising spending. (OECD, 2016). Investing in Greece
according to most economists is an extremely high risk, relatively low reward situation. Although Greece
would seem to be a magnificent opportunity, most investors (with reason) are afraid of investing in the
‘fragile economy’. The former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan said Greece would leave the
euro and the common currency would collapse. The German Institute for Economic Research’s president,
Mark Fratzscher, characterized Greece as a political and economic catastrophe that would revert to the

34

Data: OECD

2015q3

2015q1

2014q3

2014q1

2013q3

2013q1

2012q3

2012q1

2011q3

2011q1

2010q3

2010q1

2009q3

2009q1

2008q3

2008q1

2007q3

2007q1

2006q3

2006q1

2005q3

2005q1

2004q3

2004q1

2003q3

2003q1

2002q3

2002q1

2001q3

2001q1

2000q3

0

2000q1

10

76
drachma in desperation. (Winkler, 2015). However, Greece has undergone an economic metamorphosis in
the year of 2014, resulting in a potential investment opportunity for investors with stomachs of steel.
Since the election of the anti-austerity government (Syriza) the investing climate seems to have drastically
improved regarding investment in Greece. For example, the Greek bonds “… beat every publicly-traded
asset as its bonds increased in value from their lowest point in July to their highest today. Anyone
sophisticated enough to buy those Greek bonds while simultaneously shorting, or borrowing the money to
sell… made a big profit on that trade” (Winkler, 2015). Consistent with the IMF prediction of a gradual
but increasing economic growth levels, there has been an influx of income through government bonds.

Figure 7.2.2 Greece Export Performance compared to the Eurozone Area35
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As figure 7.2.2, above, demonstrates that before entering the EU, Greece had a higher export
performance than the Euro Area. After the crisis, the Greece export performance slowly went into decline.
We conclude that analyzing previous sectoral balances and Parenteau model, it is evident that Greece is a
net-importer. As suggested by Troika, product market reforms are necessary to reduce monopoly and
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oligopoly power in key economic sectors and efforts to reduce the regulatory burden should gradually
raise economic output. These reforms will further help in boosting exports which will be an indispensable
engine for growth and job creation. (OECD, 2016) Greece has relatively low exports and has a persistent
trade deficit. Due to lack of domestic demand and confidence, it’s integral for the economy’s welfare to
boost economic growth in all industries with potential. For example, rising global risks such as sluggish
growth in China would reduce exports as shipping accounts for 20% of Greek exports. Greece has
suffered excessively from slow-moving global trade growth.
Public-private partnerships (PPP) would increase investment and operational
efficiency if they brought private-sector expertise and capital to bear. PPP should
not be used as a way to relax budget constraints. It is important that risk in these
projects is correctly assessed and appropriately allocated between the public and
private sectors, and that the explicit and implicit fiscal costs be transparently
accounted for. (OECD Economic Surveys 2016)
As the quote above shows, there is a need for improvement in the business environment. Greece
ranks among the worst countries to do business in (155 out of 189), thus additional reforms are needed in
order to simplify the ways to do business, open up the economy more, removing frictional costs of
business so as to attract a higher level of investment by undertaking projects such as PPP and following
strategies laid out by the Troika.

Government, Taxes and Public Finance
A facet of Greece public life is that tax evasion is rampant, rife with corruption and a continually
pervasive feature which induces significant leakages of probable revenues which are vital to sustain the
government and the economy. There’s increasing need to broaden the tax base, bring willful defaulters to
justice and continuously strengthen tax administration by enforcing more autonomy in audits and tax
collection.
Strengthening fiscal policy is critical for a sustained recovery. The reforms which were
introduced for fiscal consolidation improved the overall fiscal balance of the government, leading to an
overall general government balance of -3.6% of GDP and a small primary balance surplus of 0.2% of
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GDP (OECD Economic Surveys 2016). Although the program initially put emphasis on the increase of
taxes and broadening tax rates, the overall tax compliance was perceptibly low (a crucial problem for the
Greek government). Moreover, due to bank recapitalization, the fiscal deficit further deteriorated.
Greek public debt to GDP ratio is amongst the highest worldwide. It’s expected that the debt-toGDP ratio would remain elevated for years, even if Greece somehow magically managed to meet the
fiscal targets established. The Greek debt-to-GDP ratio has consistently been much higher than the
Maastricht criteria; Ireland reached it’s all time high 123.20% which was Greece’s debt-to-GDP in 2001.
Currently, Greek debt-to-GDP is at 179%, which is alarmingly high. As the patterns follow, the debt-toGDP increases and the IMF enforces a new package with a new set of structural reforms which again lead
to a cycle leading to increased government debt. A large debt overhang or weak implementation of
reforms may harm growth by creating further uncertainty for the investors amidst elevated rates of
interest.

Social costs, public expenditure and economic welfare
The social cost of the crisis have been severe; child poverty has exploded, and housing costs are
becoming a haunting burden for the common man. Youth unemployment is very high, and most of
unemployed are usually so for an extremely large period leading to loss of skills, lowering their chances
to find work elsewhere creating unrest and distortion of the social fabric of the country. The pension
system remains expensive, unfair and complex while the healthcare system is slowly deteriorating. As the
Troika keep enforcing different packages on the economy and debt spirals out of control, social costs
have never been higher. There have been a few policies to reduce poverty and inequality which requires
urgent attention to revert the excessive social costs that the Greek economy has faced ensuring everyone
pays their fair share of taxes by fighting tax evasion. The key issues that continue to plague the system
are:
First, there have been moderate changes to pension reforms, even though it strengthened the longterm benefits and structure of the pension system, it’s proven to be impractical in the short run. When
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comparing the expenditure on pensions today, they are relatively high compared to other OECD countries
which are putting pressure on the government.
Second, tax evasion is a huge structural issue which is leading to large gaps between VAT
collections and an unfair advantage to those who are evading taxes leading to further taxation on those
who are already struggling to pay taxes. Strengthening the tax administration further is a vital priority for
the Greek government to ensure that they receive a fair amount of tax revenue to invest back into the
economy and not continue to break the back of those who are already subjected to high levels of taxation.

Compliance with Second Set of Milestones
Appendix 10 A has the European Commission’s report on Greece’s compliance with the second
set of milestones as of December 2015. While most measures have been delivered adequately, there have
been issues with Greece’s compliance with their health and (Government Pending Actions related)
privatization, thus for the need for additional steps. It’s evident that a significant part of the milestones
concerns the financial sector mostly for bank recapitalization purposes. However, as Greece is still
undergoing the macroeconomic adjustment program, the European Commission has not yet disclosed any
national targets for 2020. Greece has been told to focus on these following four areas to gradually exit the
crisis:36
•

Boosting investment- to support future growth opportunities

•

Structural reforms- in product, service and labor markets to raise competitiveness and investment
levels leading to greater social fairness

•

Responsible fiscal policy- to strike a balance for short-term and long-term sustainability.
Moreover, due to high deficits, Greece would need to make further efforts to fix the balance
sheets.

36

European Comission Press Release (2015)
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•

Employment policy and social protection- to enable support and protect people throughout their
lives.

7.3 Life After Austerity
The IMF states that Greece should be able to exit the crisis by the end of 2018. However, the
indicators above are evidence that exiting the crisis solely based on numbers are not enough to make up
for the damage multiple rounds of austerity have caused the economy. As Greece becomes closer to
Maastricht criteria standards, we have to acknowledge that the Eurozone failed dismally in creating an
optimal monetary union. Moreover, even though Ireland has exited the crisis, they had an easier crisis to
exit. Additionally, Ireland has also faced a lot of negative effects through austerity, specifically a low
literacy rate and a high level of emigration throughout its crisis period. This calls for a need for both the
countries to pay more attention in their own economic welfare.
Furthermore, to prevent another crisis from destroying the entire European Union, there needs to
be a change in policy. The EU needs a reunification of both monetary and fiscal policy as well as
providing more policy space for their weaker member states to achieve their macroeconomic objectives
without having a snowball effect through multiple rounds of austerity every time they sense instability. A
union that consists of such diverse economies with dissimilar potential needs further integration and a
need for a change in regime. The following chapter discusses possible policy recommendations for both
the entire European Union as well as the two specific nations. These are logical and will potentially end
up preventing further damage to the European member states now, and in the future without any political
consequences such as a Greek exit leading to a domino effect leading to the potential end of the European
Union.
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Chapter 8
Policy Implication: Can Europe be saved?
This chapter tries to explore some alternative policy recommendations for both nations to eventually have
a sustainable and efficient economy. This includes economists such as Dimitri Papadimitriou, Michalis
Nikiforos, Gennaro Zezza, Yves Smith, Jörg Bibow and Warren Mosler.
Greece
Recent press and economic reports that emanate about the Greek economy continues to show that
it limps with little to indicate that growth is poised to take off. Nor are there concerted efforts to create a
more enabling climate for business and increasing the level of investment in the economy. The new round
of austerity approved by the Greek parliament towards the last quarter of 2015 did not bring forth any
new additional measures, however, once again reinforced the previous round of austerity measures and
structural reforms as Appendix 10A states.
Ireland
On the other hand, from a recent analysis of the Irish economy the indicators reflect a journey
towards normalization of economic conditions and leads one to believe that perhaps, Ireland is finally out
of its financial crisis. Ireland also has to ensure it keeps all its finances stable to repay slowly back the
loan, but as the first country to enter and exit the crisis, all signals shows that the Celtic Phoenix is for the
time being stable. Although for the time being Ireland has strong economic growth and is projected to
continue doing so, there are a few indicators that may disturb the status quo once again and Ireland needs
to continuously make sure they are doing the right things for aspects within their control.
For example:
a)

Global crisis: Ireland’s growth has become saddled on its export sector; thus global market

volatility is potentially ruinous for the Irish economy. Moreover, due to high unemployment rates,
high debt, and mortgage, the economy will stagnate if its trading partners show sign of weakness.
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b)

Another property bubble: danger of rapid re-inflation which could trigger another spiral of

higher prices and credit lending leading to another banking crisis
c)

Eurozone turmoil: Instability in the Eurozone (specifically Greece with its massive debt

bailouts) would lead to turmoil in Ireland, this chapter focuses on policy suggestions to prevent
more turmoil
d)

The exit of the UK from the Eurozone: with leading rumors and prospects of the United

Kingdom leaving the European Union (the Brexit), it presents both “opportunities and
challenges” according to the OECD. However, due to closeness as trading partners, the Brexit
could be detrimental to Irish trade profiles even though it may lead to more investments.

Additionally, it is important to note that Ireland was never in as bad of a shape as Greece, the
austerity measures imposed were never as strong as they were in Greece, Ireland had a massive
government deficit of -32.3% due to the bailout (unlike Greece), Ireland did not have extreme
government debt levels (unlike Greece), Ireland was an exporting economy (again, unlike Greece) —in
other words, the severity of austerity was harsher in Greece than they ever were in Ireland.

Solutions
European Union as a whole
The Eurozone financial crisis is erroneously blamed on the fiscal profligacy of its weaker nations
as well as a lack of compliance with the rules of the SGP. However, without the existence of a “treasurycentral bank axis”, it’s nearly unmanageable to attempt to balance the budget categorically and establish
low public debt levels (not to mention how highly fragile this ‘vision’ is for the private sector).
“Debt—and in fact growing public debt— is a very natural concomitant phenomenon of economic
growth. The euro regime is lacking a central fiscal institution with the power to spend, tax, and issue debt.
This void is the key source of its vulnerability and ill-performance.” (Bibow, 2013)

83

Moreover, after any financial crisis, the private sector will seek to run a financial surplus as we have seen
in the sectoral balances for Ireland and even Greece. Without recovery, the private sector will not reach a
balanced fiscal position.
Previously, we have explored a vast array of strategies that could be implemented by both
economies, but it’s also crucial to investigate policy suggestions for the entire union. Moreover, it’s
important to focus on how to make the European Union robust and viable again. Jörg Bibow of the Levy
Economics Institute of Bard College presents a proposal-- The Euro Treasury Plan. The Key facets that
distinguishes this plan from the alternative policy proposals mentioned above is that firstly, it’s a regionwide project, and most importantly it emphasizes steady (not counter-cyclical) public investment as a
prerequisite for proper recovery and economic growth on an ongoing basis to prevent any immense
damage from this recent crisis. The crisis has made clear that there is a need for the Eurozone to
overcome its vulnerability as well as jointly anchor integration with an innocuous and sustainable
approach. It’s crucial that Europe has a common response to a common shock. (Bibow, 2013a)
As the euro currency union remains stuck in a crisis of its own making, Bibow proposed an areawide boost to public investment that amounts to a joint recovery program much like suggested by
Gewerkshaftsbund (2012) and Varoufakis et al. (2013). The “Euro Treasury Plan” intertwines the
expenditure and funding sides of a recovery program while also filling the void in the current euro
regime. It heals its essential source of vulnerability: the decoupling of the central bank and treasury
institutions (Bibow 2015).
At the heart of the Euro Treasury scheme proposed here is a simple and
straightforward idea. The idea is to create a Euro Treasury as a vehicle to pool
future Eurozone public investment spending and have it funded by proper
Eurozone Treasury securities. Member state governments would agree on the
initial volume of common area-wide public investment spending and the annual
growth rate of public investment thereafter. Beyond that, the Euro Treasury
operates on auto-pilot. (Bibow 2015:3)
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As the quote states, the Euro Treasury scheme is a proposal beneficial to all of the European
member states. Unlike the previous “euro bonds” proposal, the debt is not mutual; each state would alone
be responsible for their respective national public debt levels. The Euro Treasury will not directly assume
control of investment spending. Instead, it will provide investment grants according to each member
state’s potential, in line with the GDP levels or “based on the ECB/s capital key (Bibow, 2015). The Euro
Treasury looks to apply its power of taxation and revenue solely with the purpose to service the interest
on the debt to keep the debt level stable at its target; it also maintains the debt levels for crisis countries
by using special taxes designed to generate revenue to streamline debt servicing. All Eurozone countries
still have to abide by all the rules in place by treaties and the current regime as well as further structural
reforms, the Euro Treasury proposal is just applied to all current public expenditures. All the member
states would see the interest burden on their national debt shrink with improving debt ratios and a muchneeded increase of fiscal stability in the European Union. This alternative proposal allows the Eurozone to
not only foster prosperity throughout the nations but also social welfare as it stabilizes economic activity
and spending.
The Euro Treasury proposal would rectify the original defects with which the euro was born. It
creates a central fiscal institution operating side by side with the ECB. This project will provide shortterm as well as long-term recovery both directly and indirectly. Firstly, by increasing public investment
expenditure it would provide immediate growth. Moreover, it also provides direct stimulus to lead to a
balancing of current budgets while rebalancing the intra-area competitiveness leading to a more
symmetric the European Union. Finally, as a recovery program and strategy, the Euro Treasury plan
offers an option to secure an evolution from the current sate of fragility, chaos and crisis to a more (much
needed) less volatile, affluent and thriving trajectory.
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Country-specific Policy Recommendations
Levy Economics Institute of Bard College published a strategic analysis which suggests all the
following policy proposals for Greece to follow to prevent further damage to the global economy. The
suggested policies by the Levy economists as well as Yves Smith and Warren Mosler are the following:

a) Introduction of a parallel financial system based on new government bonds (“Geuros” as
referred to in the paper)
This policy proposes an option where Greece does not exit the European Union but adopts a national
currency for all domestic transactions in order to relax austerity conditions (Lordon, 2013). Unless this
exit (explained further in the last policy suggestion) is not perfectly planned, it could lead to the demise of
the European Union as we know it. However, according to the terms of the European Union treaties
(which have already mostly ben violated several times by many economies and did not test the survival of
the euro), this policy proposal is ‘strictly forbidden’. Unless, the countries bonds issued under this parallel
system were only as a means of financing, with existing euro obligations to be paid off. (Papadimitriou et
al., 2014). Richter, Abade and de Arce Borda (2013) stress that the introduction of a parallel currency
would allow a return to the euro achievable within the time frame. A key assumption is that existing
financial assets would not be redenominated into the new currency. Furthermore, the new currency would
be managed by the Bank of Greece, which would be in charge of setting a credible target devaluation rate
(suggested rate is about 50%) against the euro (Papadimitriou et al., 2014). Thomas Mayer of Deutsche
Bank suggest an introduction of government IOUs as a “fiscal currency” also advocated by Bruno Théret
and Wojtek Kalinowski, whom agree that a new currency maybe more readily acceptable. Parenteau
(2013) suggests avoiding the term currency, instead creating “tax anticipation notes” as a credible way of
financing the system. There has been an immense amount of critique and confusion about this proposal
for example how the new currency should be backed, whether or not the new currency be freely
convertible to the euro, the future of the euro after the implementation of the system, the amount of new
currency created, whether or not foreign debt would be redenominated in the new currency etc. All these

86
questions are addressed (see Appendix 11A for detailed elaboration of the critiques mentioned in the
Strategic Analysis of the Levy Institute, 2014). Since a vast majority of literature consists of a viable exit
plan, this policy contemplates an alternative which does not lead to such a potentially problematic and
drastic plan which, at the same time would stimulate net exports as well as investment within the
economy.

b) Adoption of an employer of last resort program financed through the aforementioned
parallel financial system
Without a structural change in fiscal policy, the Greek economy would continue to decline regarding
employment and growth. Even if abandoning austerity measures may temporarily alleviate the economy
but will lead to an even slower pace of recovery. Given the current rates of unemployment, even a slight
increase in government expenditure is not enough to eventually lead towards full employment. The main
idea behind the previous proposals is to simply allow Greece to restore its competitiveness and repair its
economy. The impact of these would depend on the price elasticity of Greek trade (Papadimitriou et al.
2014). With that in mind, Papadimitriou, Nikiforos and Zezza conclude that price competitiveness of the
Greek exports are very low, and thus policies aimed at export-led growth through an increase in export
prices are highly unlikely to succeed.

c) Modern version of the Marshall Plan:
The first alternative policy scenario is an updated version of the Marshall Plan. The Marshall plan also
referred to as the European Recovery Program (ERP) was an American initiative to aid Western Europe
with a donation of approximately $130 billion (in current USD) to help rebuild Western European nations
following its notorious collapse after World War II effective on April 1948. This included a removal of
trade barriers to support the war-devastated regions. This proposal would lead to a rapid increase in
government consumption as well as investment. “The amount of this exogenous fiscal stimulus aid
discussed in many Eurozone meetings- is assumed to be €30 billion, disbursed at a rate of about €2.5
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billon each quarter.” This would lead to an exogenous inflow of finances into the capital account
improving its external balance without putting pressure on the Greek government to repay an additional
loan, assuming it keeps its commitments on previous loans. However, this program will come with vast
repercussions if workers employed under this scheme are laid off towards the end of the program, which
would lead to a negative impact, despite efforts of this program to increase public capital. However,
many countries and governments would oppose to this plan in the interest of their taxpayers.

d) Temporary suspension of interest payments on public debt
The ‘Modern Marshall Plan’ debate has spurred reactions of many politicians against it. Thus, another
alternative is a temporary suspension of interest payments on all public debt as well as suspension of any
interest payments due and outstanding. Papadimitriou, Nikiforos, and Zezza (2013) consider whether
sufficient funding for lowering unemployment and restoring growth can be obtained by changes in public
debt management. Thus in this scenario, there is an assumption that all debt is frozen, all interest
payments are suspended, and creditors are persuaded to roll over maturing debt for the period. The latest
data available (2013) states that the general government debt is 183% of GDP. 80% of which is held by
the foreign sector (by Eurozone institutions responsible for refinancing the country’s debt). The Bank of
Greece holds approximately 5%. These figures, as well as the sectoral balances analysis for 2012, are
what aided in the economists as mentioned earlier evaluation of prospective interest payments for debt
management. This proposal leads to an availability of funds further than that would be available due to
austerity measures such as tax increases (especially since tax evasion has become increasingly common).
This would lead to a much-needed increase in investment within the economy and support for export
creation as well as an increase in job creation (specifically for the Greek youth which is facing a large
unemployment level of 48.9%). Although this would lead to a fall of income for bondholders, however,
an increase in investment and consumption would offset the fall and ideally lead to a net positive effect.
The main difference between this and the ‘Modern Marshall Plan’ is that in total, there would be a less
amount of funding- perhaps not the most useful solution to this ongoing, extended crisis.
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e) The Mosler Bond
The Mosler Plan is a proposal for the new Greek government bond issue to provide all required
medium term Euro funding for Greece on very attractive terms (Mosler, 2016). This new bond issue
would eliminate the risk of loss to the investors, thus stating that while in default, these transferable
securities can be used at face value plus accrued interest, for debt payments, including taxes owed to the
government (Mosler, 2011). With the elimination of risk and fear of loss, Greece may be able to fund
independently all financial obligations with reduced interest costs. This would lead to a deficit reduction
and a lack of dependence on the IMF and the European Union which have yet to display any promising
results through their apparently incompetent proposals which only lead to further increases in government
debt every time they were enforced. The lack of financial loss is an attractive foreign venture and thus,
would lead to a much-needed increase in investment as well as financial independence after being slightly
bullied by fellow nations to control their debt. If Greece has independence, it can restore some amount of
national sovereignty and regain control of the process of fully comply with the general Maastricht criteria.
With funding independence and lower interest rates, the Greek government would still have a tremendous
amount of work and effort to restore Greece to success. The Mosler Bond has so far been well received by
many peripheral country governments as it can promote a healthy and independent solution to what seems
like an eternal crisis.

f) A credible exit strategy (as the complete last resort)
There are clearly vast options for these countries which do not resort to exiting the European Union. This
is the least favorite of the options as a Greek exit would lead to tremendous chaos within the Euro,
especially in the periphery countries. It is clear to a majority of economists that the Eurozone’s main
problems are to do with the euro. Although the euro has allowed for a ‘stable’ currency with lower
interest rates, the nations have tried to address instability by focusing on tax evasion, overspending, and
trying to weed out corruption. As we have analyzed earlier in chapter 3, the dynamics of the European
Union itself is impacted by underlying structural problems and disparities between countries since before
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the union was created. It is highly unlikely that polar opposite economies such as Germany and Greece
(evident in all parameters) can get to any similarities in terms of performance outcomes. Even if we
compare just the Greek export profile to the German export profile, there is a significant difference in
magnitude, diversification, price elasticity and the products itself. Greece’s main exports include mineral
products whereas leading German exports include machinery and automobiles.
Austerity programs have clearly been an abject failure but so far are the only solutions being provided in
the Euro. Given the assumption that Greece does not find alternative solutions to their problems, Yves
Smith develops a credible exit strategy for Greece. However, economists such as Varoufakis did critique
the idea without realizing that this is a policy suggestion as a last resort. A credible exit strategy would
not be hard to implement and would consist of two essential principles (Smith 2011):
1)

Upon leaving the Eurozone, the government would have to make payments exclusively in the new

currency, meaning that the euro is now not a means of payment
2)

The government would only accept payments in the new currency ensuring the value and short

supply (for some time)
Essentially, the government spends and earns for self-provision, injecting a limited amount of the new
currency into the economy. However, this would lead to a lot of chaos, for example, if the value of this
new currency is significantly lower than the euro, everyone would desperately try to hold on to as many
euros’ cash available in anticipation of profitability. Smith (2011) states that all citizens of the country
would have the liberty of choosing whether or not their bank accounts and disposable income are
available in euros or the new currency. An important suggestion is that the new currency has a floating
exchange rate, ensuring that import prices do not increase unless the government itself decides to devalue
the currency. These are all, of course, speculative in nature, unless such a plan is implied, there cannot be
a concreter idea or a clear path as to how the economies would survive. Moreover, even one country
exiting the Eurozone could lead to a domino effect and result in collapse and chaos in the crisis-stricken
European countries.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
‘When it comes to human dignity, we cannot make compromises’ – Angela Merkel (2011)

No economic event in recent history has occupied so much print and mind space as the global
financial crisis. It has caused untold hardship and social dislocation. In particular, the study of the effect
of the crisis on the two countries, Ireland and Greece, makes one reflect as to how poor governance,
misuse of borrowed wealth, impractical short term fixes driven by mindless opportunism and politicians
can cause hardships for thousands. Furthermore, the structural flaw in the entire European Union regime
makes the member states prone to financial crisis.
After reviewing recent indicators, sectoral balances as well as the modern monetary theory into
account, we can identify a likely projection of the trajectory for the key macroeconomic indicators for
both economies to fall in line with European Union standards. Ireland is clearly making meaningful
progress and attempting to perform to its maximum potential with its outstanding recent performance
within the country and is improving its standing globally. The Irish government has put a respectable
level of effort to ensure financial stability and prevent a banking crisis.
Ireland’s seen as austerity’s poster example, notwithstanding that the Irish success story is
illusory. Moreover, it should not be taken as a proxy for a comparison to other countries because of
inherent differences among countries, especially Greece.
Ireland has many reasons to be optimistic. The country has left the worst years of the infamous
financial crisis. As indictors have suggested unemployment is dropping and the economy is growing
faster than other EU states. According to Eurostat, Ireland is likely to see robust levels of economic
growth, slowly achieving GDP levels similar to its pre-crisis levels. Even though Ireland is able to
diminish the pain austerity measures have caused, they face an advantage of increasing exports and low
corporate taxes making Ireland an attractive destination. If Ireland can maintain their budget position, and
manage to avoid a potential private sector problems i.e. corporate tax bubble, brewing on their hands, the
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economy maybe able to be restored to its ‘former glory’. The Irish have been able to apprehend a deficit
stimulus sufficient to transfer them to a private surplus position as well as a foreign sector deficit position,
leading to a favorable position as a net exporter in the pharmaceutical and technology industry. Pre-crisis,
the Irish economy spent over a decade establishing an economy based on exports, pharmaceuticals,
technology, agriculture leading to increasing foreign investment- an advantage Greece has yet to benefit
from. This enables the Irish to have a more sustainable process of development eventually leading to
compliance with the European Union criteria. Moreover, the Irish economy, unlike most other Southern
European economies, does not have high levels of public debt. Ireland’s robust level of real growth as
well as fiscal discipline has managed to reduce the government deficit notably.
Germany is often set as the foremost sample of what a ‘well developed’, ‘sustainable’ economy
looks like with its miraculous long run private sector positive balance. However, this has been hampering
other economies and putting other European states at a disadvantage, especially those that have been
under severe pressure to curb demand as well as compress imports to promote their adjustments.
Moreover, in the case of Germany, perpetual external surpluses are also the root behind the unresolved
euro crisis. If the entire Eurozone is made to follow the German example, it would persistently lead to the
depression of the domestic economies as well as provoke global tensions. Conclusively, the German
mode is the wrong model for the Eurozone
Greece, however, is still unable to rebuild their private sector into a sustainable positive balance.
By most counts, the trajectory for a somewhat healthy economy is expected after 2017. However, looking
at current growth levels and welfare indicators, that seems unlikely. Greece, unlike Ireland is still facing a
massive amount of poverty and unemployment, detrimental effects after continuous implementation of
austerity measures by the IMF. In this project, we have argued that Greece can be on the road to recovery
if and only if appropriate economic policy is implemented. This does not include continuous
implementation of strict austerity measures which have in the past only lead to an explosion of debt. It
needs to stimulate domestic and foreign investment efforts, for it to drive high real growth drive job
creation and resultantly lower unemployment levels. It’s vital that they are serious about restructuring
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their fiscal policy. When analyzing the sectoral balances, it is evident that countries that have their own
currency can constantly print fiat currency thus fuelling deficit. The problem with the euro is clear. There
are vast differences in economic performances between these states, making it impossible to implement a
one-size fits all fiscal policy. The deficit limits restrict fiscal tools governments can use to combat
recession and unemployment. Most importantly, the loss of economic sovereignty hinders Greece’s
ability to achieve its macro-economic objectives using interest rate policies.
The Maastricht Criteria constrains member states’ fiscal policy by design. Even though Ireland
exited the crisis in 2013, their ‘success’ was in part due to the relatively small size of fiscal contraction,
the rebuilding of private sector savings, and the return to a net-exporting position. By contrast, Greece’s
adjustment (austerity) was much more severe, the private sector financial position never fully recovered,
and the country remained in a net-importing position. Before the formation of the European Union, the
world economy has never faced such a problem as the European Union was the first area with a common
currency. It’s facing a major crisis and even after efforts some countries are still mired in less than the
satisfactory conditions they started with. It has been clear that harsh fiscal consolidation measures
imposed on Greece are an ineffectual solution to its’ major problems. Even with the Troika’s imposed
strategies aimed at a much needed increase in exports through internal devaluation lead to a fall in unit
labor costs and a minimal growth of exports (primarily in oil-related goods). The main focus of Greece
should be repairing the rapidly deteriorating living standards (specially to prevent a fall in tourism) and
decline in domestic consumption. Moreover, even though many economists propose an increase in
tourism maybe beneficial for Greece, tourism alone can not save the economy. Even though Greece
receives increasing amount of tourists, the benefits for the domestic market is limited. The average tourist
receipts have been decreasing over the past few years, especially due to the rising level of poverty and
chaos. Moreover, an increase in tourism in Greece directly and indirectly leads to an increase in imports
needed to accustom these tourists.
There has been a vast amount of alternative policy options explored above, all of which should be
considered extensively to offer Greece a certain amount of freedom and to regain independence to fix
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their own economy as their government sees fit with minimal supervision of other European institutions.
Although there is importance for Greece to build up their export sector, there needs to be focus
increasing domestic demand, adjusting social welfare and reviving consumer confidence in Greece. There
needs to be a kick start to the Greek economic growth engine. This entails programs and policies such as
job guarantees, increase in infrastructure spending, increase in investment opportunities, removing
frictional barriers to business etc. A public job guarantee program could be an option that could deliver a
relatively quick reestablishment of living standards to the majority of the population. A well-organized
approach, balanced with a healthy dose of realism and most importantly some luck would be needed for
Greece to remerge as a strong economy.
As this project concludes, Ireland did succeed in mitigating the complications it faced due to
austerity measures, however, undeniably, their crisis was very different. Ireland should not be seen as a
role model for Greece, or in fact any other country. As we have previously discussed, Greece has had
tougher and more enforced rounds of austerity than any other European nation. Additionally, they have
also had more unfavorable effects to economic and social welfare than any other European nation.
Greece, however, has impressive prospects and is currently increasing and the government debt to GDP is
decreasing thus there is scope for Greece to exit this crisis, however, they need to be vary of corruption,
welfare, unemployment and deflation.
The Maastricht criteria has evidently failed dismally in promoting stability and growth in the
recent years. It has made it clear that the EMU needs reformation and the Maastricht regime is
fundamentally incomplete. A monetary union without fiscal association defeats the purpose of the regime.
In the end of this project we offer various proposals in order to establish an effort for a functional fiscal
union designed to aid each country in crisis and ensure that each country deals with their crisis with their
own merits, to promote more stability within European countries.
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1A Real GDP Growth for Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, France, Spain and Portugal37
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2A Greece Actual Versus Predicted Output38

2B Ireland Actual Versus Predicted Output 39
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3A Greek Crisis Timeline 40
Ø January 1, 2001 - Greece drops its currency, the drachma, in order to join the European Union
"Eurozone." Greece is the 12th country to adopt the euro. In order to meet the EU's standards,
Greece makes deep cuts in public spending.
Ø 2004 - Greece spends approximately $11 billion dollars (U.S.) on the Summer Olympics in
Athens.
Ø November 15, 2004 – Greece admits that it gave misleading information to gain admittance to the
Eurozone. One of the EU's requirements for Eurozone member countries is deficits below 3% of
GDP. Greece has not met those criteria since 1999.
Ø October 4, 2009 - George Papandreou wins election as prime minister.
Ø November 2009 - Greece's national debt reaches €262 billion. Prime Minister Papandreou says
that the 2009 budget deficit will be 12.7% of GDP, far above the EU limit of 3%.
Ø December 17, 2009 - Thousands of union workers go on strike to protest cuts in government
spending.
Ø January 13, 2010 - The European Commission condemns Greece for giving false data on its
finances and says the deficit and debt may be higher than the figures released in November 2009.
Ø February 2, 2010 - Prime Minister Papandreou makes a televised address, appealing to Greek
citizens to support austerity measures.
Ø February 10, 2010 - Public workers in Greece strike in protest against new austerity measures.
Ø March 3, 2010 - Protests break out across the country. The government announces plans to lower
the deficit by cutting public employees' salaries and raising taxes.
Ø April 11, 2010 - EU finance ministers announce a €30 billion bailout package for Greece.
Ø April 23, 2010 - Greece requests a €45 billion bailout from the EU and the International

40

Timeline Source: European Debt Crisis Fast Facts, CNN.com, 2015
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Monetary Fund.
Ø May 2, 2010 - The IMF, the European Central Bank and the European Commission announce a
three-year aid package, worth €110 billion, designed to rescue Greece.
Ø May 11, 2011 - Clashes erupt between police and approximately 20,000 protesters in Athens.
Ø June 4, 2011 - Protests break out in Athens after Prime Minister Papandreou announces large cuts
in public-sector employment.
Ø June 15, 2011 - Protesters hit the Greek Ministry of Finance with gasoline bombs.
Ø July 21, 2011 - European leaders agree to a second bailout package. European governments and
the IMF will contribute a total of €109 billion. Private bond holders will be expected to contribute
€37 billion.
Ø October 2, 2011 - The Greek cabinet announces that it adopted a draft budget for 2012, but will
miss key deficit targets. According to the preliminary budget, Greece's budget deficit will be
€18.69 billion, or 8.5% of GDP, in 2011. Greece originally agreed to a deficit of €17.1 billion, or
7.8% of GDP, with the International Monetary Fund, European Commission and the European
Central Bank.
Ø October 19-20, 2011 - Tens of thousands of people protest against new austerity measures being
considered by Greece's Parliament. At least one person is killed.
Ø October 27, 2011 - European Union leaders announce an agreement on debt crisis measures,
including a deal with private sector investors to write down Greek bonds by 50%, which
translates to €100 billion and will reduce the nation's debt load to 120% from 150%.
Ø November 6, 2011 - Papandreou announces that he will resign from office on the condition that
the €130 billion deal is approved.
Ø November 11, 2011 - Lucas Papademos, a former professor, banker, and European Central Bank
vice-president, is sworn-in as prime minister of Greece.
Ø February 12-13, 2012 - Lawmakers in Greece vote to approve another round of austerity
measures, sought in return for a new Eurozone €130 billion ($172.6 billion) bailout deal. As
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lawmakers debate, police turn tear gas and stun grenades on protesters outside Parliament, and
twenty-five protesters and 40 officers are injured.
Ø February 21, 2012 - Eurozone finance ministers approve a second bailout for Greece, including
€130 billion ($173 billion) in new financing.
Ø March 9, 2012 - Creditors agree to a plan to restructure Greek government bonds. The deal means
Greece has cleared its final hurdle to qualify for the €130 billion bailout program from the
European Union and International Monetary Fund.
Ø June 20, 2012 - New Democracy leader Antonis Samaras is sworn in as Greece's new prime
minister.
Ø June 21, 2012 - Greece swears in a new cabinet, putting an elected government in charge of the
country for the first time in 224 days.
Ø November 11, 2012 - The Greek parliament approves the nation's 2013 austerity budget that
contains steep cuts required for Greece to receive the next installment of economic bailout funds.
The final tally in the parliament was 167 votes in favor, 128 opposed, with four abstentions.
Ø September 12, 2013 - Unemployment in Greece reaches 27.9%. Additionally, 58% of people
under 25 are unemployed as well.
Ø April 9, 2015 - Greece announces it has scheduled a 460 million euros ($497 million) payment to
the IMF, dismissing rumors the government might not have enough cash to pay on time.
Ø June 18, 2015 - European officials and the IMF fail to strike a deal on Greece's bailout program.
Ø June 30, 2015 - The midnight deadline passes for the Greek finance ministry to pay the 1.5 billion
euros ($1.7 billion) it owes the IMF. This means Greece has become the first developed economy
to effectively default to the IMF.
Ø July 5, 2015 - Voters in cash-strapped Greece overwhelmingly reject austerity measures and
Europe's bailout offer.
Ø August 20, 2015 - Greece receives the first chunk of its third bailout. The package, worth up to 86
billion euros ($95 billion), will help the country avoid an outright financial collapse. All of the
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countries that use the euro currency have agreed in principle to bail out Greece, but the IMF is
only monitoring the situation so far. Today's date is the deadline to pay 3.2 billion euros ($3.5
billion) to the ECB, in order to stay in the Eurozone. Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras says in
a televised address that he is resigning and calls for early elections.
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3B Irish Crisis Timeline 41
Ø September 2008 - Ireland is the first Eurozone country to fall into recession.
Ø September 30, 2008 – During the international financial crisis, Ireland announces a bailout plan
worth €400 to stabilize the country's six main banks.
Ø December 18, 2008 - Chairman of Anglo Irish Bank Sean Fitzpatrick resigns, admitting that he
hid €80 million in secret loans from shareholders.
Ø December 21, 2008 - The Irish government pumps €5.5 billion in three of the country's largest
banks.
Ø January 15, 2009 - The Irish government is forced to nationalize Anglo Irish Bank to keep it from
collapsing.
Ø February 4, 2009 - Prime Minister Brian Cowen announces €2 billion in public spending cuts.
Ø February 10, 2009 - Insurance company Irish Life & Permanent confirms that it made a loan to
Anglo Irish of €7 billion in 2008.
Ø February 11, 2009 - Ireland announces that it will prop up Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Bank
with 7 billion. The government takes a 25% indirect stake in the banks.
Ø February 20, 2009 - A report is released showing that Anglo Irish Bank lent €451 million to 10
customers so they could buy shares in the bank. There are 15 customers who each owe the bank
€500 million.
Ø February 21, 2009 - Tens of thousands of protesters rally in Dublin.
Ø May 29, 2009 - The government props up Anglo Irish bank with another €4 billion.
Ø February 19, 2010 - The government takes a 16% direct stake in Bank of Ireland, when the bank
cannot make a payment.
Ø March 30, 2010 - Ireland props up Anglo Irish Bank with another €8.3 billion.
Ø March 31, 2010 - Anglo Irish Bank reports a loss of €12.7 billion, the largest corporate loss in
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Irish history.
Ø May 13, 2010 - The Irish government takes a 18% stake in Anglo Irish bank.
Ø June 9, 2010 - The government's stake in Bank of Ireland rises to 36%.
Ø September 30, 2010 - The Central Bank of Ireland announces that the bailout of Anglo Irish bank
could end up costing taxpayers €34 billion.
Ø September 30, 2010 - Ireland's deficit is revised to 32% of GDP, the largest deficit for a Eurozone
member since 1999.
Ø September 30, 2010 - Ireland props up Irish Nationwide Bank with €2.7 billion.
Ø October 26, 2010 - The Irish government announces it must make budget cuts of €15 billion in
order to reduce the budget deficit to 3% of GDP by 2014.
Ø November 21, 2010 - Prime Minister Cowen announces that Ireland has applied for aid from the
EU and IMF.
Ø November 24, 2010 - Ireland outlines €15 billion in spending cuts and tax increases. It refuses to
raise its low tax on corporations. This plan is intended to reduce the budget deficit to 9.1% of
GDP in 2011.
Ø November 27, 2010 - Thousands rally in Dublin, protesting the bailout and budget cuts.
Ø November 28, 2010 - Ireland accepts a €67.5 billion bailout package.
Ø December 23, 2010 - The government injects another €3.7 billion into Anglo Irish bank, taking its
stake to 93%.
Ø March 31, 2011 - An examination of the books of Irish banks shows a €24 billion shortfall. The
Central Bank of Ireland says that it expects that the government will take control of the country's
six largest banks.
Ø June 1, 2012 - Ireland's voters approve a European treaty that aims to enforce stricter fiscal
discipline.
Ø July 5, 2012 - Ireland completes its first bond sale since its bailout in 2010. The Irish government
raises €500 million, or $626 million, by selling 3-month Treasury bills at a yield of 1.80%.
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Ø December 13, 2013 - Ireland exits the bailout program established by the EU and IMF in 2010,
the first Eurozone country to do so. Although Ireland is no longer reliant on the IMF and EU for
funding, it will continue to pay off its emergency loans into the 2030s.
4A Basic Literature on Robert Parenteau Model42
Assuming the economy as a whole is divided into three different sectors:
•

The domestic private including households and firms

•

The government

•

The foreign sectors

Then the following identity must hold true:
Domestic Private Sector Fiscal Balance + Fiscal Balance +Foreign Financial Balance = 0
This can be easily displayed diagrammatically as the Parenteau model which includes the Maastricht
Criteria.
Domestic Private Sector Financial Balance = Current Account Balance – Fiscal Balance

42

Parenteau (2010)

104
5Ai Greece Exports Bubble Diagram43

5Aii Greece Imports Bubble Diagram44

43
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Data (manual): The Observatory of Economic Complexity
Data (manual): The Observatory of Economic Complexity
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6Ai Ireland Exports Bubble Diagram45

6Aii Ireland Imports Bubble Diagram46
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7A Greece Detailed Austerity Package47
A summary of all Greek austerity packages to date.
1. 9th February 2010
The first austerity package was a minor package in order to limit the deficit. It all emerged with the Greek
prime minister’s promise to the World Economic Forum of Davos, Switzerland. The package was
implemented on the 9th February 2010 and was expected to save €0.8 billion, including a freeze in all
government employee salaries, a 10% cut in bonuses and cuts in overtime workers, public employees and
work-related travels.
2. 5 March 2010
The second austerity package included further moves to increase government income. The package
emerged after the rapidly rise of the Greek/German 10-year debt yield spread. The Greek parliament
passed the "Economy Protection Bill", which was expected to save another €4.8 billion. The package was
implement on 5 March 2015 and it included 30% cuts in Christmas, Easter and leave of absence bonuses,
a further 12% cut in public bonuses, a 7% cut in the salaries of public and private employees, a rise of
VAT from 4.5% to 5%, from 9% to 10% and from 19% to 21%, a rise of tax on petrol to 15%, a rise in
the (already existing) taxes on imported cars of up to 10% –30%, among others.
3. 23rd April 2010
The third austerity package came as a result of the First Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece
announced by the Greek rime minister on 23rd April 2015. Changes aimed at saving €38 billion through
2012, representing the biggest government overhaul in a generation. Actions included sale of 4000
government-owned companies, limits on "13th and 14th month" salaries, a new rise of VAT from 5% to
5.5%, from 10% to 11% and from 21% to 23% and other cuts to public employee benefits, pension
reform and tax increases.
It was met with a nation wide general strike and massive protests leading to three deaths, dozen injuries
and 107 arrests
.
4. 29th June 2011
He fourth austerity package emerged from the deviation of the Greek economic program and was voted
by parliament on 29th June 2011. It’s known as the Mesoprothesmo, the mid-term plan. It includes rise
47

Various references, collected and collated from Wikipedia
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taxes for those with a yearly income of over €8,000, an extra tax for those with a yearly income of over
€12,000 among others. On 11th August 2011 the government introduced more taxes, this time targeted at
people owning immovable property. The new tax, which is to be paid through the owner's electricity bill.
5. 20th October 2011
The fifth austerity package was aimed to ensure the 6th bailout instalment for Greece. The new bill
(frequently is called multi-bill) hit mostly the civil servants and the retirees. It was voted by the Greek
parliament on 20th October 2011 amid protests. The bill included among other, major cuts of the wages of
civil servants through to the definition of a single payroll and cuts for the pensions over €1000.
6. February 21st 2012
The sixth austerity package remerged from negotiations for austerity measures that would allow further
loans and a second bailout package to prevent sovereign default. As a result, Greece was granted by the
EU a €100 billion loan and 50% debt reduction through "private sector involvement" (PSI) for future
reductions in government spending. The measures included among other 22% cut in minimum wage that
goes to €586 from €750 per month.
7. 7th November 2013
A first part of the multi-bill was voted on 31st October and concerned the privatizations. The main part of
the bill was voted on 7th November 2013 and includes labor market reforms and budgetary changes such
as the total abolition of 13th and 14th month salaries among them.
8. 28th April 2013/ 17th July 2013
The eighth austerity package included two successive multi-bill with urgent measures so that Greece to
receive the new instalment of the bailout package. Both was a requirement of the creditors in order to be
given the next bailout instalments. It included layoff of another 15,000 public employees among them
school guards and municipal policemen. The first multi-bill was voted by the parliament on 28th April
2013 and the second was voted by the parliament on 17th July 2013.
9. 9th May 2014
The ninth austerity package was imported by the government on April 2014 and was approved by
parliament on 9th May 2014 with 150 votes for and 119 against. It included provisions about Greek
economic policy during the four next years, under the title Medium-term Fiscal Strategy plan 2015-2018.
The bill provided freeze of wages and pensions over a period of the next four years, until 2018. Also it
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provided cuts public sector's expenses such as cuts for the expenses of the Ministry of Health among
others.
10. 16th July 2015
The tenth austerity package emerged from the agreement of Greece with Eurozone for a new €86 billion
bailout over three years. The deal requires the Greek parliament to approve the measures. The first set of
new austerity package was voted by Greek parliament on 16 July 2015. It includes transfer of many
products in the high rate VAT (23%) and rise of corporation tax from 26% to 29% for small companies
among others. A second set of measures voted on 23 July 2015 that concerns the Code of Civil Procedure.
11. 14th August 2015
The eleventh austerity package included the bill that concerned the third bailout agreement between
Greece and the 'quartet' of creditors (EU, ECB, ESM and IMF). It was approved on the 14th August 2015
with 222 votes for, 64 votes against. The new bill included provisions for the rise of various taxes and
changes in the retirement system.
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7B Ireland Detailed Austerity Package48
A summary of all Irish extended fund facility arrangement by the IMF
1. December 16th, 2015
IMF Reaches Staff-level Agreement with Ireland on €22.5 Billion Extended Fund Facility
Arrangement
The IMF’s Executive Board approved December 16 a three-year lending arrangement for Ireland,
totaling €22.5 billion. The loan is part of an international rescue package worth €85 billion that also
involves the European Union, European bilateral lenders, and financing from Ireland’s own cash
reserves. Continued liquidity support for Ireland’s banks from the European Central Bank is an
essential component of the program.
2. May 16th, 2011
IMF Completes First and Second Reviews Under Extended Arrangement with Ireland and
Approves €1.58 Billion Disbursement
The The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) today completed the first and
second reviews of Ireland’s performance under an economic program supported by a three-year, SDR
19.5 billion (about €21.8 billion; or US$30.9 billion) arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility
(EFF), or the equivalent of about 1,548 percent of Ireland’s IMF quota. The completion of the
reviews enables the immediate disbursement of an amount equivalent to SDR 1.41 billion (about
€1.58 billion; or US$2.24 billion), bringing total disbursements under the EFF to SDR 6.42 billion
(about €7.20 billion; or US$10.19 billion).
“Although the external environment continues to be challenging, the authorities are committed to
sustained strong program implementation. Supporting these efforts with a more comprehensive
European plan would help overcome market doubts, regain market access, reduce the threat of
spillovers, and bring about a recovery of the Irish economy.”- Naoyuki Shinohara

48

Excerpts from staff reports of the IMF
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3. September 2nd, 2011
IMF Completes Third Review Under the Extended Arrangement with Ireland and Approves €1.48
Billion Disbursement
“The authorities are implementing major fiscal adjustment effectively by keeping the budget on track to
meet the 2011 targets. Building a strong consensus on a medium-term fiscal plan in the coming months
will reinforce confidence in achieving the substantial fiscal consolidation ahead, and reduce uncertainties
around tax and spending policies for households and businesses. The recent establishment of a Fiscal
Advisory Council will support sound fiscal policies on an ongoing basis. The Irish authorities have
maintained resolute implementation of their economic program. The economy is showing signs of
stabilization and financial market conditions have also recently improved. Ireland’s economy, however,
faces a weakening in trading partner growth, which could dampen the pace of Ireland’s recovery in the
near term. Continued timely implementation of the program remains essential to support the ongoing
recovery, limit contagion risks, and rebuild market confidence.” - Mr. Naoyuki Shinohara
4. December 15th, 2011
IMF Completes Fourth Review Under the Extended Arrangement with Ireland and Approves
€3.9 Billion Disbursement.

The authorities are also continuing to implement a sizeable fiscal adjustment, with the budget on
track for the 2011 fiscal targets. The recently announced 2012 budget includes €3.8 billion (2.7
percent of GDP) in spending and revenue measures, to reach a deficit target of 8.6 percent of GDP,
and the authorities’ Medium-Term Fiscal Framework sets out the path to bring the deficit below
3 percent of GDP in 2015. These actions are helping to restore confidence as part of the
government’s strategy to put the economy on a path of sustainable growth, sound public finances,
and job creation.
Led by strong export performance, Ireland’s real GDP growth turned positive in the first half of
2011, reaching an annual rate of 2¼ percent in the second quarter, with annual growth of 1.1 percent
projected in 2011. Weakening activity in Ireland’s trading partners is projected slow Irish exports
such that real GDP growth remains around 1 percent in 2012.
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5. February 27th, 2012
IMF Completes Fifth Review Under the Extended Arrangement with Ireland and Approves €3.2
Billion Disbursement
The Irish authorities continue to advance wide-ranging reforms to restore the health of the financial
system so it can support Ireland’s recovery. Major progress in downsizing the banking system has been
made, with the two largest banks disposing of almost €15 billion in mainly foreign assets in 2011 at better
prices than anticipated. A comprehensive strategy for personal insolvency reform has been announced,
including an out-of-court debt settlement mechanism that would cover mortgages and other secured debts.
The substantial fiscal consolidation targeted for 2011 was achieved with a margin, with the general
government deficit reduced to 10 percent of GDP, well within the program target of 10.6 percent. This
result was attained despite weaker domestic demand, reflecting the authorities' strong revenue
administration and firm expenditure control. Budget 2012 targets further fiscal consolidation to lower the
deficit to 8.6 percent of GDP and sets out a clear path to reach the 3 percent of GDP deficit target by
2015.
Steps to support growth and job creation are being put in place. Reforms of sectoral wage agreements
have been submitted to parliament to make wage-setting in occupations hard hit by recession more
responsive to economic conditions. The authorities are also strengthening the effectiveness of activation
and training policies to help job seekers get back to work. The government recently announced the
disposal of €3 billion in state assets to enhance competitiveness while securing value for the state and
reinvesting one-third of the proceeds.
6. June 13th, 2012
IMF Completes Sixth Review Under the Extended Arrangement with Ireland and Approves €1.4
Billion Disbursement
Ireland’s policy implementation has continued to be steadfast and ownership of the program remains
strong despite the considerable challenges the country is facing. However, as financial tensions in the
euro area have resurfaced, Irish sovereign bond spreads have risen in recent months to exceed the level at
the outset of the EU-IMF program. Slowing growth in trading partners is expected to dampen Ireland’s
export-led recovery, with real GDP projected to expand by ½ percent in 2012, down from 0.7 percent in
2011. At the same time, Ireland’s progress in strengthening the financial system is reflected in the
stability of overall level of deposits in the banking system.
After achieving the substantial fiscal consolidation targeted for 2011 with a margin, budget outturns for
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the first five months of 2012 again were in line with expectations. At the end of May, the cumulative
primary deficit was 1.3 percentage points of GDP narrower than in the same period last year, and just
below the authorities’ profile for the year. Income tax, VAT and corporation tax continued to over
perform, and some 40 percent of the full-year tax revenue target has now been collected. The expenditure
overrun seen in earlier months has also moderated, to less than 0.1 percent of GDP.
Financial sector and structural reforms are advancing as envisaged. The authorities remain committed to
achieving the 2012 fiscal targets and are developing a package of specific measures to further underpin
the 2013–15 consolidation. In the financial sector, the authorities are deepening reform efforts to improve
the quality of bank assets and facilitate resolution of household debt distress, and are developing a
framework to strengthen the credit union sector. Importantly, the authorities are reviewing and adapting
their strategy for growth and job creation in view of the challenging external environment.
7. September 5th, 2012
IMF Completes Seventh Review Under the Extended Arrangement with Ireland and Approves
€0.92 Billion Disbursement
The 2012 budget remains on track for the fiscal deficit target of 8.6 percent of GDP, despite a slowing in
real GDP growth from 1.4 percent y/y in 2011 to a projected ½ percent in 2012 owing to weaker trading
partner growth. In the year through July, the exchequer primary deficit was 0.7 percent of GDP below that
in the corresponding period of 2011. Income tax, VAT, and corporation tax collections were ahead of
expectations, yet this over performance was partly offset by higher health spending and unemployment
benefits. The authorities have announced corrective measures for health spending.
Financial sector reforms have continued to advance, with the authorities submitting a restructuring plan
for Permanent TSB to the European Commission, and they are preparing a roadmap to wean banks off the
costly Eligible Liabilities Guarantee (ELG) scheme while preserving financial stability. The authorities
introduced a personal insolvency bill to parliament at end June, and, at the Central Bank’s request, banks
are preparing to roll out a set of loan modification options to address rising mortgage arrears.
On June 29, Euro Area leaders stated that the Euro group will examine the situation of the Irish financial
sector with the view of further improving the sustainability of the country’s well-performing adjustment
program. This positive signal helped the Irish government return to sovereign debt markets, by raising
€4.2 billion of new funds in 5-year and 8-year bond financing in July, with the bulk of the issuance taken
up by foreign investors. A further €1.0 billion in 15 to 35 year amortizing bonds was issued in August,
tailored to meet domestic pension fund needs.
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8. December 17th, 2012
IMF Completes Eighth Review Under the Extended Fund Facility with Ireland and Approves €0.89
billion Disbursement
Market conditions for Irish sovereign debt are much improved following the June 29, 2012 announcement
that the Euro group is examining the situation of the Irish financial sector with a view to further
improving the sustainability of Ireland’s well-performing program, and also of Outright Monetary
Transactions by the ECB. Together with Ireland’s strong policy implementation, these developments have
enabled Irish sovereign yields to decline notably in 2012 and allowed Ireland to access significant market
funding in the second half of the year.
Looking ahead, however, a more gradual economic recovery is projected, with growth of 1.1 percent in
2013 and 2.2 percent in 2014, with public debt expected to peak at 122 percent of GDP in 2013. This
baseline outlook is subject to significant risks from any further weakening of growth in Ireland’s trading
partners, while the gradual revival of domestic demand could be impeded by high private debts, drag from
fiscal consolidation, and banks still limited ability to lend. If growth were to remain low in coming years,
public debt could continue to rise, in part reflecting the potential for renewed bank capital needs to
emerge.
9. March 22nd, 2013
IMF Completes Ninth Review Under the Extended Fund Facility with Ireland and Approves
€0.97 Billion Disbursement
Ireland’s strong policy implementation has continued and positive signs are emerging. Real GDP growth
was 0.9 percent in 2012, and employment rose slightly over the year, although unemployment remains
high at 14.2 percent. Further deepening its market access, Ireland issued €5 billion of 10 year bonds at
4.15 percent in March.
The 2012 fiscal deficit of 7¾ percent of GDP was well within the 8.6 percent target. In 2013, the fiscal
deficit is projected at 6¾ percent of GDP, moving toward the target of below 3 percent by 2015. Public
debt is expected to peak at 122½ percent of GDP this year and decline in later years provided growth
picks up from the 1 percent rate projected in 2013.
Financial sector reforms have continued to advance, but banks remain weighed down by nonperforming
loans at about 25 percent of total loans. The Irish authorities have therefore established targets for banks
to durably resolve distressed mortgages, with banks required to propose sustainable solutions to
50 percent of distressed mortgage accounts by end-2013.
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10. June 17th, 2013
IMF Completes Tenth Review Under the Extended Fund Facility Arrangement for Ireland and
Approves €0.95 Billion Disbursement
The Irish economy grew modestly for a second year in 2012 and positive signs are emerging with
employment rising just over 1 percent year-on-year in the first quarter of 2013, though the rate of
unemployment remains high at 13.7 percent. Fiscal outturns in the first five months are in line with
Budget 2013. Ireland targets a general government deficit of less than 3 percent of GDP by 2015 and with
growth projected to accelerate from 2014, public debt is expected to peak at around 123 percent of GDP
this year. In the banking sector, just over 25 percent of loans are nonperforming and losses persist,
hindering new lending. Addressing these issues is the focus of the authorities’ preparations for entry into
European banking union ahead of the European stress test exercise next year.
11. September 26th, 2013
IMF Completes Eleventh Review Under the Extended Fund Facility Arrangement for Ireland and
Approves €770 Million Disbursement
The Irish economy grew 0.4 percent in the second quarter but still contracted 1.2 percent year-on-year as
exports dipped and domestic demand continued to decline at the pace seen in 2012. At the same time,
employment grew 1.8 percent year-on-year and recent indicators suggest a growth pick up in the second
half of 2013. The unemployment rate has eased from 15 percent in early 2012 to a still high 13.4 percent
in August, yet 58 percent of the unemployed have been out of work for over a year.
Fiscal results for the first eight months are in line with Budget 2013, with the fiscal deficit expected to be
about 6.8 percent of GDP (excluding one-off guarantee payments) in 2013 and public debt reaching 123
percent of GDP. Irish banks are gradually returning to profitability but carry nonperforming loans of 26½
percent of their loan portfolios and credit to the private sector declined by 4.5 percent year-on-year in
July. In March the authorities set targets for banks to resolve mortgages in arrears and they are conducting
diagnostics of Irish banks ahead of European stress tests in 2014.
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12. December 13th, 2013
IMF Completes Twelfth and Final Review Under the Extended Fund Facility Arrangement
13.
for Ireland
This is the last review under the EFF arrangement, which will expire on December 15. Owing to steadfast
policy implementation by the authorities, the EU-IMF supported program has been completed
successfully. Ireland has pulled back from an exceptionally deep banking crisis, significantly improved its
fiscal position, and regained its access to the international financial markets. Growth, though slower than
initially projected, has exceeded the euro area average. Key policy actions have included necessary bank
support, restructuring and downsizing, improvements in bank supervision and regulation, fiscal
consolidation measures totaling some 8 percent of GDP and improvements in the institutional framework
for fiscal policy. These and other efforts leave Ireland in a much strengthened position and a range of
economic indicators suggest a recovery is emerging in the second half of 2013.
Yet important challenges remain. Public debt is projected to reach 124 percent of GDP this year, although
this partly reflects Ireland’s strong cash buffer. The fiscal deficit is expected at about 7 percent of GDP,
within the target of 7.5 percent of GDP, yet still high. Banks remain weighed down by low-yielding
indexed mortgages and by 26.6 percent of loans being nonperforming, including some 17.4 percent of the
total values of mortgages in primary residences being in arrears for over 90 days. Unemployment, though
significantly below its peak of 15.1 percent in early 2012, remains unacceptably high at 12.5 percent in
November, with almost 60 percent of job seekers out of work for over a year.
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8A Detailed Country Specific Recommendations Ireland49
2015 Ireland Country-specific recommendations (CSRs)
1

Ensure a durable correction of the excessive deficit
in 2015. Achieve a fiscal adjustment of 0.6 % of
GDP towards the medium-term budgetary
objective in 2016. Use windfall gains from better
than-expected economic and financial conditions to
accelerate the deficit reduction and debt reduction.
Limit the existing discretionary powers to change
expenditure ceilings beyond specific and
predefined contingencies.
Broaden the tax base and review tax expenditures,
including on value-added taxes.

2

49

Take measures to increase the cost effectiveness of
the healthcare system, including by reducing
spending on patented medicines and gradually
implementing adequate prescription practices. Roll
out activity-based funding throughout the public
hospital system.

Ireland has made limited progress in
addressing CSR 1 (this overall evaluation
excludes an assessment of compliance with
the Stability and Growth Pact).
No progress in limiting discretionary
powers to change expenditure ceilings.
These have been revised up repeatedly on
the back of better than expected growth, i.e.
beyond specific and predefined
contingencies. No changes have been made
to the legal framework defining the
conditions under which expenditure ceilings
can be revised.
Limited progress in broadening the tax
base. Announced measures implementing
internationally agreed efforts to reduce tax
avoidance are likely to contribute to
broadening the tax base. However, changes
to the universal social charge, postponement
of the revaluation of self-assessed property
values used to calculate local property tax
liabilities and introduction of further tax
credits in the 2016 budget are likely to
narrow the tax base. A report on tax
expenditure was published recently but is
limited in scope as it covers only a limited
number of tax expenditures and does not
cover VAT at all.
Ireland has made some progress in
increasing cost-effectiveness in the
healthcare system, even though it remains
an issue, with renewed expenditure
overruns in 2015. Savings on
pharmaceuticals have been generated by the
increased recourse to generics and the use
of internal reference prices and lists of
interchangeable medicines. Prescription by
international non-proprietary name is still
not compulsory for medicines to be
dispensed in Ireland. The planned mid-term
review of the agreement on the supply and
pricing of patented medicines with the Irish
Pharmaceutical Healthcare Association

European Comission Staff Working Document, Country Report for Ireland 2016
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(IPHA) was never concluded. Formal
engagement with the IPHA for its
replacement is only expected to start in
early 2016. An Activity Based Funding
Implementation Plan 2015-2017 was
published in May 2015.

3

Take steps to increase the work-intensity of
households;
and to address the poverty risk of children;
by tapering the withdrawal of benefits and
supplementary payments upon return to
employment;
and through better access to affordable full-time
childcare.

Ireland has made some progress in
addressing CSR 3. Some progress in
increasing the work intensity of households.
Reforms to the One Parent Family Payment
(OFP) are continuing. The largest group of
recipients of OFP, around 30 000,
transitioned to a jobseeker’s payment in
July 2015. Some progress in addressing the
poverty risk of children. The 2016 budget
announced that Child Benefit would
increase by a further EUR 5 to EUR 140 per
month per child. A new Social Inclusion
and Community Activation Programme was
launched in April 2015. The programme
aims to cater for individuals who are further
from the labour market. Target groups
include children and families from
disadvantaged areas and lone parents. Some
progress in tapering benefits. The 2016
budget announced reforms to the Family
Income Supplement, which has increased
the number of eligible families. The roll-out
of the Housing Assistance Payment, which
reduces the disincentive to return to work
arising from housing subsidies for the
unemployed, is continuing. Some progress
in improving access to childcare. The InterDepartmental Working Group on
Investment in Childcare identified a number
of policy options to strengthen childcare
services. The 2016 budget announced plans
for the development of a single Affordable
Childcare Programme providing a new
simplified childcare subsidy programme to
be in place in 2017. The 2016 budget also
announced new funding for childcare
amounting to EUR 85 million and
increasing the total funding for childcare by
a third. EUR 47 million will be spent on a
second year of free preschool education for
children from 3 years of age until they start
primary school.
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4

Finalise durable restructuring solutions for a vast
majority of mortgages in arrears by end-2015;
and strengthen the monitoring arrangements by the
Central Bank of Ireland.
Ensure that restructuring solutions for loans to
distressed SMEs and residual commercial realestate loans are sustainable by further assessing
banksʼ performance against own targets.
Take the necessary steps to ensure that a central
credit registry is operational by 2016.

Ireland has made some progress in
addressing CSR 4. Some progress in
finalising durable restructuring solutions.
The Central Bank of Ireland has requested
banks to provide plans on how they intend
to conclude sustainable solutions with the
vast majority of mortgage borrowers in
arrears by the end of Q1-2016. As of the
end of September 2015, 86 % of concluded
restructuring solutions were meeting the
terms of arrangements. However, meeting
the terms of the arrangement is not
necessarily an indicator of sustainability.
Not all restructures are sustainable solutions
since they include short-term solutions,
such as interest only restructures.
Substantial progress in strengthening
monitoring arrangements. The five main
mortgage holdersʼ mortgage restructuring
proposals are now monitored by the Central
Bank of Ireland through a more granular
framework that has replaced the mortgage
arrears restructuring targets. The Central
Bank of Ireland started publishing statistics
on nonbank lendersʼ mortgage arrears
portfolios in early 2015, as more non-banks
hold mortgage loan arrears, especially longterm ones. Some progress in ensuring
restructuring solutions for loans to SMEs.
The Central Bank of Ireland continues with
the monitoring of distressed SME and
commercial real estate loan resolution
against the set of key performance
indicators. Still, their resolution continues to
be a lengthy process. The National Asset
Management Agency (NAMA) is ahead of
schedule with the sale of its development
property and commercial loan portfolio.
NAMA is due to be wound down in 2018.
Some progress in setting up a credit
registry. A revised plan for the
implementation of the central credit registry
has been adopted while pushing back the
timeline for effective implementation.
Lenders may start submitting data on
individuals from the end of September
2016, while the deadline for the
submissions for all categories will only be
at the end of 2017. Inquiries to the central
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credit registry when granting new loans to
individuals will become mandatory for
lenders from 2018 onwards, while it will
become obligatory for all categories of loan
in mid-2018. The development of secondary
legislation is still ongoing, with the
intention to finalise the regulations by
March 2016.

Europe 2020 (National targets and progress)
Employment rate target: between 69 % and 71 %

The employment rate (Eurostat definition,
age group 20-64) rose to 69.1 % in Q3-2015
compared with an average of 63.7 % in
2011- 2012.

R&D investment target: 2.0 % of GDP

Ireland has set a national R&D intensity
target for 2020 of 2.0 % of GDP but has
made no recent progress towards that target.
Investment in R&D reflects the economic
contraction. R&D intensity of 1.55 % in
2014 has decreased from 1.58 % in 2013.
Public sector R&D intensity in 2014 was
0.41% and business R&D intensity 1.14 %.
Business expenditure on R&D, which has
been evolving in recent years more
favourably than public expenditures, has
been supported indirectly by an R&D tax
credit scheme that has seen a large uptake.

Reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in
sectors that are not covered by the Emission Trading
System by 20 % compared to 2005 levels.

Non-Emission Trading System greenhouse
gas emissions decreased by 12 % between
2005 and 2013. National projections
indicate that the country will miss its 2020
target by about 10.1 percentage points with
existing measures and by about 5
percentage points with additional measures.

Renewable energy target: 16 % proportion of renewable
energy in total gross energy consumption in 2020.

With a proportion of 8.6 % of renewable
energy in 2014, Ireland is close to its 20132014 interim targets as set out in the
Renewable Energy Directive. However, the
existing policy, market and budget
framework appears to be insufficient to
enable the stepwise achievement of the
2020 objective.
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Energy efficiency target: 13.9 million tons of oil
equivalent expressed in primary energy consumption
(11.7 million tons of oil equivalent in final energy
consumption).

In 2013, Ireland identified national
indicative targets for energy efficiency
(equivalent to 20 % energy savings in
2020). As regards primary energy
consumption, Ireland has set more
ambitious indicative targets in the 2014
National Energy Efficiency Action Plans, as
compared with the initial target. This
represents a welcome improvement
compared with the first set of notified
targets. Both primary and final energy
targets are deemed adequate when
compared with GDP estimations for 20142020. As regards trends, primary energy
consumption did not change in 2014 and
remained at 13.4 million tons of oil
equivalent.

Early school leaving target: 8 %

Ireland has achieved the target with an early
school leaving rate of 6.9 % in 2014. There
has been a consistent positive trend in
recent years from 11.5 % in 2010, 10.8 % in
2011, 9.7 % in 2012 and 8.4 % in 2013.

Tertiary education attainment target: 60 %

Ireland is one of the leading Member States
in terms of tertiary education attainment
rates, with 52.2 % of the population aged 30
to 34 years with that level of education in
2014. This remains short of Irelandʼs own
Europe 2020 national target of 60 % but 14
percentage points above the EU average

To reduce the number experiencing consistent poverty
to 4 % by 2016 (interim target) and to 2 % or less by
2020, from the 2010 baseline rate of 6.2 %, which will
lift at least 200 000 people out of the risk of poverty and
exclusion between 2012 and 2020 (revised target).

The number of people at risk of poverty or
social exclusion decreased from 1.36
million in 2013 to 1.27 million in 2014.
This remains significantly above the precrisis level of 1.05 million in 2008.
Achieving the national target remains
ambitious.
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10A Detailed Report on Greece’s comliance with second set of milestones of December 201551
#

Action

1

After presenting to KYSOIP, the Authorities will propose to the institution for
discussion a concept note or policy paper outlinnig options for the key decisions
on the design of the independent revenue agency, in order to ensure faster
drafting and adoption of the legislation in time for the first review.
The Authorities will take measures to secure revenue collection: (i) Adopt
measures, including legislatative if necessary, for cross-schecking reigstrations of
fue storage tanks (fixed or mobile) to combat fuel smuggling; (ii) appoint a
procurement commiittee to be able finalise the purchase of software for VAT
network analysis to combat VAT cariousel fraud.
Health: the Government will (i) issue the Ministreal Decision on the
implementation of hospital clawback; (ii) issue a Ministerial Decision to revise
donawrd the prices of diagnostics from private providers to align te spending to
clawback ceiling.
Operationalize the HFSF selection panel for the appointments of all members
and chairman including (i) reahcing agreement on a binding Terms of Reference
for the selction process; (ii) having the HFSF submit to the EWG a proposal on
the remuneration of Selection Panel members which has been agreed with the

2

3

4

50
51

Status: Done
Or Pending
DONE

DONE

DONE

DONE

Data: OECD Database
European Comission Report on Greece’s Compliance with the second set of milestones of December 2015
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5

6

7

8

9

Eruopean institutions; (iii) agreeing a timetable for the enxt steps eith the aim of
completing appointments by end-December 2015.
Household insolvency legislation: (i) Adopt secondary legislation on the
financial assistance scheme for vulnerable housholds to facilitate the required
payments required under the houshold insolvency law. (ii) The Bank of Greece
will issue a decision on the procedure and criteria to be used for termining the
maximum of borrower repayment capacity, the amount that creditors would have
percieveed in case of emergency enforcement and the potential prejudice to
creditors; (iii) proviced a detailed implementation plan to estabilish a Credit and
Wealth by end-June 2016 as an independent authority that wil identify borrowers’
payment capabilities for the facilitation of banking institutions.

NPL Strategy: (i) adopt the relvant legislaition enabling licensing and regulation
for non-bank service providers and loan transfers, to be effective as of 1 January
2016. For loans secured by the primary residences as well as loans of SMEs and
consumers, the implementaiton framework will be finalised in the context of the
first review of the ESM programme; (ii) initiate preparotyory work to update and
amend the out-of-court debt resolution law; (iii) proposa a coordination
mechanism overseen by the Bank of reece with a mandate to consider large debts
to both private and public creditors and identify and execue specific NPL
resolution action; (iv) submit a Presidential Decree to establish a debt information
network and debt information centres; (v) Bank of Greece ot appoint a single
special liquidator and introduce a perforamnce-based remuneration scheme ofr
liquidators in consultation with HFSF; (vi) HFSF to nominate an executive board
member and internal team dedicated to NPL resolution; (vii) set up a new project
structure for implementing and monitoring the NPL strategu including the
sablishment of a special coordinating secretariat and project management office at
the Bank of Greece to supporrt the Governemtn Council for Private Debt
Management.
The authorities will follow up as agreed with OECD and adopt or otherwise
address 10 more recommendations of the OECD tooklit II on beverages and
petroleum products in addition to t hose completed in the context of the first set of
milestones.
The authorities shall issue in agreement with the instituions of a Misnterial
Decision to (re-) convene the inter-minesterail committee for regulated
professions.
On structural, funds, the authotities will (i) implement Law 4314/2014 on
European Structureal and Invesmtnet Funds, adopt all associated delegated acts
and any other measure indespensable for hthe activation of the avaialble funds
and ensure the fulfilment of signifcantly-delayed ex-ante conditionalities (ii) For
the 5 motorway concession projects and for the metor and waste water and solid
waste projects, the authorities will: (a) draw an action plan with agreed timelines

DONE*

DONE
(6v*)

DONE

DONE

DONE
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with concessioanries and/or contractors and including necessary actions to resolve
bottlenecks; (b) agree with the institutions and set- up an inter-minesterial
coordination committee to monitor the implementaiton of the action plan and to
ensure the necessary decisions are taken timely.
10 Spatial planning and forestry law: the Authorities will (i) present the institutions
with proporsals for potential improvemments of the law 4269 on spatial planning;
(ii) agree with the institutions the content of and submit the Preidental Decree on
forestry defintions
11 Energy: the Authorities will take irreversble steps (including announcement of
date for submission of binding offers) to privaize the elcteicity transmission
company, ADMIE, unless an alternative scheme is prvovided, with equivalent
results In terms of competition and prospects for investment, in line with the best
European practices and agreed with the instutitions to provide full ownership
unbungling form PPC.
12 Privatisation: The Authorities will (i) endorse a plan for the new privatisation
fund wso that it can be become operational as soona s possible in early 2016;
(ii)complete thr Governmetn Pending Actions identified by the instututions for
2015Q4.
13 The authotirites will (i) adopt a law to reform the unified wage grid, effective 1st
January 2016, setting the key paramters in a fiscally netural manner and
consistent with the agreed wage bill targets and with comprehensvie application
accreoss the public sector, including decompressing the wage dsitribution acrsos
th wage spectrum in conneciton with the sklil, performance, responsibility and
position of staff; (ii) commit to continue the attrituion rule in 2016 while the
ration for the years 2017-2019 will be set in the MTFS 2016-2019
*(follow up needed)

DONE

DONE

DONE
(12ii*)

DONE
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11A Elaboration of Critiques52

1. Should the new currency be freely convertible in euros?
Pros: a convertible currency would be more reliable, and therefore demand for the new currency
should stabilize. Cons: convertibility may lead to capital flight, and to ineffectiveness of monetary
policy conducted in the new currency.
2. How should the currency be backed?
By gold and/or international reserves: some authors have suggested this possibility, which, of course,
goes along with full currency convertibility, which would enhance confidence in the new currency.
On the other hand, this approach would limit the actions of the central bank, pre- vent the government
from running expansionary policies, and, last but not least, be implausible given the size of the
current net asset position of Greece.
By future euro revenues from tourism and external trade:
some authors propose convertibility into euros, or convertibility at a future date, based on the
expected euro receipts from trade, especially from tourism. This option, again, would limit the fiscal
space for government action.
By tax revenues: in this case, the government would issue the new currency (or “fiscal certificates”)
in coordination with the central bank, making it clear that it would accept the currency at par for tax
payments. When taxes become due, the government can satisfy its needs for liquidity by issuing new
IOUs. This option is more likely to be effective if government IOUs are not convertible into euros
(although euros should be convertible into the new currency IOUs, if needed).
As pure fiat money: no authors explicitly suggest this approach, which implies a strong trust in the
ability of the new currency to act as a store of value (i.e., not depreciate). For practical purposes, if
the government were willing to accept the currency for tax payments at par, this proposal would not
be different from the previous one but would allow banks to make loans in the new currency, while in
the previous regime the currency would be a liability of the government.

52

Source: Levy Economics Institute Strategy Analysis, February 2014
Note: See Schuester (2013) for a comparative survey of proposals relative to the EZ.
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3. How much of the new currency should be created?
Only a few authors address this point directly, and the appropriate amount would depend on our point
(2) above. If convertibility with the euro can be maintained, the maximum amount of the new
currency should be determined from the target exchange rate, or as a ratio to the euro value of
reserves. For “fiscal certificates,” a simple option would be to pay existing government obligations
with residents in new currency bonds, and therefore, the amount of new currency bonds to be issued
would be equal to the existing debt of the government to the private sector. A more expansionary
policy would set the desired amount of the new currency in circulation as an instrument to achieve the
desired level of employment, for a targeted inflation rate.
4. Which transactions should be denominated in the new currency?
Most of the proposals in the literature suggest that all transactions among residents would be
immediately denominated in the new currency, including wages and prices for domestic goods.
Foreign goods would need to be purchased in euros, and sold on domestic markets in either euros or
the new currency. A few authors suggest that wages could be paid in both currencies, either adopting
a fixed share or letting the agents contract individual outcomes.
5. Would financial assets held by domestic residents be converted into the new currency?
Authors have widely divergent opinions on this matter, ranging from no conversion, so that all bank
deposits (but also household mortgages) would remain in euros; to full conversion; to a mixed
solution. It should be clear that if debt obligations were to remain in euros when the debtor has no
access to euro revenues, a devaluation of the new currency against the euro would lead to a default of
the private sector. Switching all euro bank deposits to the new currency, when the latter is expected to
devalue, would imply a loss of purchasing power for foreign goods but little effect on purchasing
power for domestic goods, as long as prices were kept under control.
6. Would foreign debt be redenominated in the new currency?
It is in the power of a sovereign government to change the currency denomination of contracts signed
under the law of the issuing country, even when they involve nonresidents. However, most of
Greece’s foreign debt has been issued under British law, and an attempt at conversion would imply
complex legal problems. It would require an international agreement in order to avoid a complete
default on existing foreign debt.
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